Betterment Recovery: A Financial Proposal For Sounder Land Use Planning by Wexler, Marvin
Yale Review of Law and Social Action
Volume 3
Issue 2 Yale Review of Law and Social Action Article 5
1973
Betterment Recovery: A Financial Proposal For
Sounder Land Use Planning
Marvin Wexler
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Review of Law and Social Action by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation





A Financial Proposal For Sounder Land Use Planning 
Many commentators have focused atten-
tion on the problems and potential of the 
land use planning process. Others have ex-
amined the relative merits of various ap-
proaches to public finance. But very few 
have inquired into the complex connec-
tion between the two legal and institu-
tional systems. 
Betterment recovery, a process by which 
the government recaptures value which its 
planning decisions have created, is a phe-
nomenon which makes that connection. 
This article is an attempt to fill a vacuum 
which exists in both thought and practice. 
It is written with a conviction that the 
subject is an important one. 
Marvin Wexler is a third-year student at 
Yale Law School and an editor of Law & 
Social Action. 
Betterment recovery may well be a pre-
condition for the implementation of an 
intelligent and comprehensive system of 
land-use planning. That this is so is es-
pecially important at a time when a dra-
matic increase in public intervention in 
the land market may be necessary to deal 
with some of our large environmental and 
social problems. Moreover, betterment 
recovery would remove many of the in-
equities associated with the creation of 
increases in property value by govern-
mental action, while providing the public 
resources with which to realize more 
fully the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of 
compensation for land taken by public 
condemnation. Betterment recovery thus 
holds a central place in any scheme of 
land-use planning that is to be both ration-
al and just. 
After a survey of the current law relating 
to betterment and worsement in the land 
market, this article will go on to make the 
case for betterment recovery in the public 
arena, examine methods for betterment 
recovery, and, finally, evaluate the legal 
and political prospects for its implementa-
tion. 
1
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Betterment and Worsement in the Land Market: 
Current Law 
An externality arises, in economic theory, when the ac-
tions of one party bring costs or benefits to another 
party, which are not completely borne or enjoyed by the 
initiating party. In the context of the land market, exter-
nal costs may be referred to as worsement and external 
benefits as betterment. 1 
Betterment and worsement are commonplace in the land 
market. On the grand scale, changes in the transportation 
network can affect the uses and values of land to a large 
extent,2 yet such changes in value are rarely internalized 
to the party who effected the change. On a micro scale, 
similar effects occur. The behavior and appearance of the 
residents in a residential area affect the value of the lots 
in that area. Upkeep (mowing the lawn, repainting, etc.) 
is only the simplest of illustrations.3 These costs and bene-
fits are not internalized. 
The existence of externalities in the land market is not 
disturbing in itself. After a period in which the word "ex-
ternality" elicited the Pavlovian response, "Internalize," 
perhaps since Coase suggested that it is by no means clear 
what is an externality ofwhat,4 people concerned with 
these problems have taken a more discriminating approach, 
focusing on the policy implications of each instance of 
, externalization. With this in mind, I turn to a closer anal-
ysis of betterment and worsement in the land market, 
examining the two phenomena in terms of whether the 
betterment and worsement are created by public or pri-
vate action. 
To facilitate the discussion, let me focus on four exem-
plary factual situations. 
Private Action by A Decreases the Value of B's Land 
A opens a nightclub in a middle-class residential a(ea. The 
club is not particularly noisy, but it does attract custo-
mers from a near-by lower-class residential area. The resi-
dents in the area of the nightclub are not comfortable 
with the life-style of the customers and they have vague 
fears of robbery, encroachment, etc. Some move out, 
and the owners in the area find it difficult to fill the 
vacancies at the same rent. The value of their property 
has been diminished. 
2 Public Action Decreases the Value of B's Land 
- An urban renewal development contains, on one side, 
a power plant. This plant abuts on a residential area. The 
noise, smell and unsightliness of the power plant decrease 
the value of the homes in the area. 
- B's land is undeveloped and subject to a residential 
zone which requires lots of at least 30,000 square feet. 
The zoning ordinance is amended, however, to require a 
minimum lot area of l 00,000 square feet. The effect of 
the change is to substantially decrease B's chances of sell-
ing or using his land. The value of that land has been 
decreased. 
3 Private Action by A Increases the Value of B's Land 
A builds a shopping center across the street from B's gas 
station, on what is presently vacant land. The shopping 
center is to be served by automobiles, and a large parking 
lot is part of the plan. As a result of this development, 
B's business will increase dramatically. 
4 Public Action Increases the Value of B's Land 
- An urban renewal project, including offices, commer-
cial uses and some luxury apartments, is developed di-
rectly adjacent to B's vacant lot. The area used to be a 
slum. B's land is considerably enhanced in value. 
- B's land is vacant and zoned for agricultural uses. B 
does not now use his land for agricultural purposes be-
cause of various market factors. A residential developer 
approaches B and makes a generous offer, contingent, 
193 
2
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 3 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol3/iss2/5
194 
upon the granting of a zone change from agricultural to 
residential. B secures the change in zone; his land has been 
increased in value. 
In each of these actions, it appears that A and the govern-
ment's actions produce costs or benefits which fall on B. 
Internalization of these costs and benefits would occur 
if A and the government could recapture the benefits and 
be made to bear the costs. 
An examination of the working of the market and of the 
legal system will disclose how much internalization pres-
ently occurs. 
Compensating Worsement Created by Private Action 
A's nightclub is decreasing the value of B's land. Does B 
have a remedy? 
Tort theories of liability offer one solution. Indeed, the 
facts postulated are from Reid v. Brodsky. 5 There, the 
residents sued the nightclub owner in nuisance, to enjoin 
the operation of the establishment. The court held that 
the nightclub constituted an unreasonable use of the land 
and enjoined its operation. 
The vagueness of the contours of nuisance law is admir-
ably illustrated by the ALI Restatement of the Law, Torts, 
1939, in which the doctrine is summarized in this manner: 
The actor is liable in an action for damages for 
a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest 
in the private use and enjoyment of land if, 
a the other has property rights and privileges in 
respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; 
and 
b the invasion is substantial; and 
c the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the inva-
sion; and 
d the invasion is either 
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or 
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable 
under the rules of governing liability for 
negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous 
conduct.6 
An intentional invasion of another's interest in 
the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable 
under the ... [above J •.. rule, unless the utility 
of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of 
the harm. 7 
Thus the current doctrinal limits on internalization via a 
lawsuit in nuisance include the concepts of property 
rights vested in B, the magnitude of the "invasion" of 
those rights, proximity, and a cost-benefit analysis of the 
interests involved. 
Calabresi, following Coase, observes that the tort rule of 
liability does not exist in a vacuum; rather, it has im-
portant effects on the possibility and outcome of mar-
ket solutions: 
Regardless of who was initially liable, there 
would be bribes or transactions bringing about 
any change in the behavior of any individual 
that would cause a greater reduction in ... costs 
than in pleasure. 8 
However, Calabresi points to transaction costs (the cost 
of information and the cost of implementation) as a de-
terrent to a market solution. Thus, the landlord, if he 
found his tenants moving out, might be able to"bribe" 
the nightclub owner into closing or into converting it to 
a more conforming use, but the tenants might have been 
less successful because of the cost of tenant organization. 
Still another remedy, beyond the courts and the market, 
exists for B. Land use zoning and other police power 
tools are the classic approach to external cost problems 
in the land market. Through zoning, the public establishes 
rules designed to prohibit uses which will have adverse 
effects on other uses and users. Codes which establish 
minimum housing standards have .the same effect of com-
pelling each user to take into account the effects of its 
actions on others. In our night club hypothetical, we as-
sume that (through bad zoning planning?) A's use is in 
conformance with the zoning ordinance. B may have re-
course through other police power mechanisms, the 
noise code or fire code, for examples. 
If we assume that because of the temporal priority of B's 
presence or for some other reason these costs should be 
internalized to A, then we have seen that the courts and 
the political process do accomplish this result to a sub-
stantial extent. Internalization is not complete, chiefly 
because of the existence of transaction costs and the fail-
ure of the legal doctrine to re-examine its goals, if it can 
be said to have any, in the light of the existence of these 
external costs. However, considerable attention is now 
being given to an effort to rewrite tort Jaw along these 
lines.9 
In sum, worsement by private action is a problem which 
the legal system has addressed; it is not always left lying 
on what 19th Century jurists termed "the innocent vic-
tim" or what a modern-day lawyer cum economist might 
call "the externalitee." 
Compensating Worsement Created by Public Action 
B's property has been subjected to a zone which requires 
a minimum Jot size of I 00,000 square feet. He is quite 
unlikely to find a user. Does B have a remedy? 
The facts are those of Aronson v. Town of Sharon. 10 
There, the town argued that the ordinance was a reason-
able exercise of the police power, designed to "encourage 
leaving land in the natural state ... [so as to afford the 
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residents of Sharon) amenities ... fundamental to men-
tal and physical health." 11 The court felt otherwise, hold-
ing that the zone constituted a taking of property which 
required compensation: 
We cannot resist the conclusion that, however 
worthy the objectives, the ... [zone) attempts 
to achieve a result which properly should be the 
subject of eminent domain. As Mr. Justice 
Holmes said ... 'while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking ... A strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is 
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of pay-
ing for the change ... This is a question of de-
gree - and therefore cannot be disposed of by 
general propositions. ' 12 
To the extent that eminent domain doctrine recognizes 
that a taking has occurred, worsement created by public 
action is compensable and thereby internalized to its 
creator. Professor Frank Michelman distils four tests for 
taking from the case law: physical invasion; diminution 
of value; balancing social gains against private loss; private 
fault and public benefit. 13 
For now, it is sufficient to recognize that the legal system 
is quite concerned about the phenomena of worsement 
created by public action, so much so that it has estab-
lished compensation as a constitutional requirement, fed-
eral as well as state. 
Recovering Betterment Created by Private Action 
A's shopping center increases the value of B's land. Can 
A somehow recover that increase in value for himself? 
With regard to a judicial remedy, the common Jaw doc-
trine of unjust enrichment is germane. As described by 
Gardner, the idea behind this doctrine is that "one who 
receives anything of value from another ought to pay for 
it unless it came to him as a voluntary gift;" Gardner sees 
this postulate as one of the "four fundamental ideas" of 
contract law .14 
Certainly A did not intend a gift to B. Also, unjust en-
richment doctrine rests not on the existence of an express 
contract, but on the law of quasi-contract which inter-
venes in the absence of a promise by the defendant. Since 
B's failure to promise is no bar and since A did not intend 
to give Ba gift, one would·think that unjust enrichment 
offered a remedy to A. 
However, the scope of unjust enrichment doctrine is care-
fully circumscribed. Gardner's reference to "voluntary 
gift" has been parsed in the Restatement to these words: 
A person who without mistake, coercion or re-
quest has unconditionally conferred a benefit 
upon another is not entitled to restitution, ex-
cept where the benefit was conferred under 
circumstances making such action necessary for 
the protection of the interests of the other or of 
third parties. 15 
A does not have an action for restitution in the courts. 
A would be better advised to pursue a market solution. 
He might well approach B, before development occurs, 
with the suggestion that if B will not pay him a portion 
of the increased value, he will build a competing use 
(another gas station) in his shopping center, or he will de-
sign the development so that the traffic does not encoun-
ter B's station, or he will locate the development else-
where, where the abutting owners will pay. In this situ-
ation, B would retain a portion of the enhanced value as 
a price for settlement; otherwise, B would have no incen-
tive for bargaining. Another approach A might take would 
be to buy B out without disclosing to him his plan for 
development. In this way, A would reap the entire bene-
fit for himself. 
The effectiveness of these methods will depend upon the 
transaction costs which they entail. It is difficult to de-
termine the extent to which such behavior does exist. We 
do know, however, that straw buyers are a common phe-
nomenon. The Rouse Company's efforts in connection 
with their secret accumulation of the land on which Co-
lumbia Maryland, was built is an illustration of the buy-
, 16 
out approach to betterment recovery. 
The extent of recovery of betterment created by private 
action is uncertain; to the extent that it does occur, it 
occurs in the marketplace. 
Recovery of Betterment Created by Public Action 
B's land is rezoned and immediately becomes more valu-
able. C's land just happens to be located next to an urban 
renewal project which will attract so many people that C 
can quite profitably convert his land use from a parking 
lot to a ten-story garage. Can the public authority which 
"created" this increased value recapture it? 
Although no laws have been designed with the function 
of betterment recovery in mind, today five areas of the 
law incidentally accomplish something like this. 
The Property Tax 
Theoretically, the increased value of B's land should be 
reflected in an increased assessment of its value and an 
increase in the property tax that B pays to the muncipal-
ity - a recapture of the increased value. However, this 
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The combination of a relatively low tax (mill) rate and a 
system of gross underassessment17 results in an effective 
property tax rate which ranges from 0.5 percent in Ala-
bama to 2.4 percent in Maine and Massachusetts. 18 Re-
assessment, the sine qua non of betterment recovery 
through a property tax, is generally believed to be a rather 
infrequent occurrence. 19 One must conclude that the 
current property tax represents a very poor betterment 
recovery device. 
Moreover, the property tax is an inherently unsatisfactory 
betterment recovery device even if its rate were increased 
and reassessment were frequent. Because it is levied every 
year, the property tax would (if levied at a substantial 
rate on land which has been bettered) force some land-
owners to pay tax on paper increases in values, possibly 
resulting in a forced sale of the land in order to pay the 
tax. This illustrates the importance of the concept of 
realization to betterment recovery. 
2 The Income and Capital Gains Taxes, State and Federal 
When B sells his land, which has been enhanced by a zone 
change, he will pay capital gains tax on that transaction. 
Or, if he decides to develop the property himself, the in-
come he derives from the development will be taxed. 
Underassessment and reassessment problems do not arise 
in the administration of the capital gains and income 
taxes, except in cases of dishonesty. However, the real 
rate of recovery is almost as partial under these taxes as 
under the property tax. Other things being equal, the 
rational receiver of betterment will sell his land so as to 
incur the capital gains tax and not the income tax. This 
means that only one-half of the increase in the land value 
will be taxed. That one-half, meanwhile, will be taxed at 
a rate from about 20% to 70%.20 So, in the end, only 10 
to 35 percent of the betterment can be recovered. But, 
because of the existence in the income tax structure of 
various tax minimization devices which effectively reduce 
the rate of taxation, the upper stratum of that l 0-35 per-
cent continuum is more theoretical than real. Moreover, 
the stepped-up basis provision for inherited property no 
doubt allows a good deal of betterment to go untaxed.21 
At the same time, of course, other sellers of appreciated 
property who have not been the recipients of such a wind-
fall are being taxed at the same rates. There is no attempt 
to distinguish between the two types of gains and treat 
them differently. 
In summary, the income and capital gains taxes as pres-
ently constituted would appear to be an unfair, inade-
quate and inefficient means of recovering publicly cre-
ated betterment. 
3 Special Assessments 
Special assessments are a form of financing local improve-
ments. McQuillan describes them as: 
those special and local impositions upon the 
property improvements, which are necessary to 
pay for the improvement, and arc laid with ref-
erence to the special benefit which the property 
is supposed to have derived therefrom ... The 
foundation of the power to lay a special assess-
ment ... for a local improvement ... is the bene-
fit which the object of the assessment or tax 
confers on the owner of the abutting property, 
or the owners of property in the assessment or 
special taxation district, which is different from 
the general benefit which the owners enjoy in 
common with the other inhabitants or citizens 
of the municipal corporation ... Accordingly, 
it is now well settled ... that adjacent property 
may be specially assessed to defray, in whole or 
in part, the cost of local improvements by which 
such property is especially benefited. The doc-
trine ... is based for its final reason on enhance-
ment ofvalues.22 
Thus the relation of special assessments to the recovery of 
publicly created betterment is obvious. 
However, limitations today confine special assessment 
law in a number of important ways. 
First, special assessments can be levied only in connection 
with physical improvements. These assessments are crea-
tures of statute and the authorities agree that these stat-
utes universally limit assessment to this context.23 Thus 
special assessments have no application today where pub-
lic action increases land values other than by physical im-
provement, for example through a change in zone. This 
limitation is suggested by the name by which this prac-
tice is generally known - "special assessment financing." 
Second, the use of special assessments is narrowly con-
fined even within the area of physical improvements: spe-
cial assessment financing is limited to financing of local 
improvement: 
... it is essential that the improvement should 
be local in character as distinguished from gen-
eral ... A local improvement is a public im-
provement which, although it may incidentally 
benefit the public at large, is made primarily for 
the accommodation and convenience of the in-
habitants of a particular locality, and which is 
of such a nature as to confer a special benefit 
~pon the real g:operty adjoining or near the 
improvement. 
What this means is not at all clear. Since special benefit is 
the heart of special assessment theory, perhaps it means 
that where there is no special benefit this form of financ-
ing is not acceptable. Courts appear to understand this to 
mean that large-scale public improvements cannot be 
financed through special assessment.25 Municipalities 
have generally limited their use of the practice to such 
purposes as street imp1ovements and construction, sewer 
and drain construction, street lighting and waterworks 
construction, and street sprinkling and cleaning.26 5
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Third, it appears that the amount of the assessment is 
presently quite limited.27 Statutory limitations which 
restrict the assessment to from twenty to seventy-five 
percent of assessed valuation are common.28 Also, the 
formula by which the assessment is calculated is univer-
sally a cost fomula (e.g., ratio of B's land benefited to all 
land benefited multiplied by the cost of the improvement 
equals the assessment). Therefore, the assessment will al-
ways be no greater than the cost of the improvement, 
regardless of the size of the betterment the improvement 
yields. 
Fourth, in some jurisdictions statutes limit the property 
on which special assessments can be levied to that which 
abuts on the improvement.29 
In spite of these limitations, special assessment law is the 
closest thing we presently have to a mechanism for the 
recovery of publicly created betterment. For this reason, 
it is worthwhile to inquire more deeply into the theoret-
ical and procedural nature of this tax. 
Special assessments are initiated in two ways, by vote of 
the municipal governing body or by a vote of a majority 
of the residents in the area to be affected, sometimes fol-
lowed by a vote of the governing body. Thereafter a spe-
cial assessment district is created, which raises money 
through the issuance of bonds, administers the improve-
ment and assesses those who have property in the dis-
trict. Assessment occurs upon the completion of the im-
provement. Let us observe what this means in practice. 
Eighty owners live on Mansfield Street between Sachem 
and Division. Fifty of them own cars and desire the street 
to be repaved. The city government thinks that this proj-
ect is of very low priority, given other needs and given 
budgetary constraints. The fifty residents who want the 
improvement have a free-loader problem: if they pay for 
the repaving themselves, they would not be able to re-
cover the benefits their action would confer on others. 
So they resort to the special assessment mechanism, 
which, in some jurisdictions, without the assent of the 
municipal government,30 coerces the dissenting thirty 
owners into paying for part of the improvement. 
This perspective suggests that the special assessment de-
vice arose not out of a desire to recover betterment but 
becau.se private individuals could not get their local gov-
ernment or their neighbors to finance improvements for 
which they were willing to pay "their share." This per-
spective also allows some rather fundamental questions 
to be raised about the legal soundness of this practice, 
questions with which the undeveloped and uninspiring 
case law31 has not come to grips. 
First, it is acknowledged that the object of special assess-
ment financing must be public, in order to comply with 
the public purpose requirement.32 Yet how can the im-
provement be for a public purpose if it must at the same 
time be a "local improvement?" McQuillan, following 
the case law, sees no conflict: 
A local improvement is a public improvement 
which, although it may incidentally benefit the. 
public at large, is made primarily for the accom-
modation and convenience of the inhabitants of 
a particular locality ... 33 
Interestingly, this definition is almost identical to the 
formula used to characterize a zoning ordinance as spot 
zoning, which is universally held to be unconstitutional 
as unjustified by police power purposes (the general wel-
fare).34 The only way to explain this difference is by 
postulating a different content for the public purpose 
rule than is used in police power inquiries. But why should 
it be illegal for a municipality to regulate s9 as to accom- . 
plish x while it is legal for it to spend public funds so as 
to accomplish x? The question is especially acute in the 
context of special assessment law, where the thirty Mans-
field Street dissenters are certainly being subject to coer-
cive "reguiation." Stripped of its doctrinal clothes, the 
naked question is: why should public funds and public 
processes be used to make improvements which are pri-
vate in character? 
Second, the rationale of the special assessment, as noted, 
is benefit received. Yet who decides if a benefit is actually 
received? As the law stands, the initiators of the assess-
ment (be they citizens or municipal officials or both) and 
perhaps the courts on appeal make that decision. The 
"assessee" may object, at hearing and on appeal to the 
courts, but prevailing doctrine holds that benefit is a 
matter of legislative determination, reviewable only if 
arbitrary.35 Challenging a special assessment is an all but 
hopeless task.36 
Thus the thirty residents of Mansfield Street are assessed 
for the "improvement" without their acknowledgement 
that they have received a benefit. Yet not only do these 
hypothetical thirty citizens not own cars, they positively 
dread cars; they perceive the increase in traffic on the 
street as a threat to their safety. 
The case law appears to recognize this problem only sub 
rosa. On their face, the cases uphold special assessments 
against challenges that they constitute takings of property 197 
without compensation.37 But in their strict scrutiny of 
such elements as the boundaries of assessment districts, 
the formulas used for assessment, and the definition of 
"local improvement," the case law seems to acknowledge 
the existence of the difficulty. Of course, this solution 
further restricts the scope of special assessment application. 
Third, special assessment practice gives rise to an interest-
ing equal protection problem. Mansfield Street residents 
get their street improved, let us hypothesize, while other 
streets are much more in need of repair. Why, then, don't 
the residents on those other streets improve their paving 
6
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in the same fashion? Because in order to enter the special 
assessment game the group must be able to pay the assess-
ment. Because assessment must be paid out-of-pocket, 
while the benefit is realized only upon disposition, only 
those with ready cash can play. The result is that so-called 
public improvements go only to those who can afford 
them. 
When required, governmental assent to the creation of a 
special assessment district acts as a potential corrective 
to this effect to the extent that the government will seek 
to protect the interests of dissenters in the assessment 
group. However, inherent in the use of the special assess-
ment as it now stands is this regressive effect. Courts are 
only now beginning to be confronted with claims of this 
kind.38 
Fourth, under those procedures in which property owners 
are the sole determinants of special assessment, the 
process looks very much like a forbidden delegation of 
eminent domain powers from the municipality to private 
individuals. The municipality is forced to make the im-
provement and the dissenters are forced to pay. Indeed, 
if the cost is high enough and the particular owner is poor 
enough, that owner might be forced to sell his property. 
There is authority in support of the right of an individual 
or private group to receive a grant of the power of emi-
nent domain, but the case law clearly states that the 
power can be delegated to a private individual or groups 
only for a public use. 39 This brings me full circle, to the 
inquiry of the first legal problem. However, here the use 
can be justified only under the eminent domain public 
purpose requirement, not under an arguably more expan-
sive taxing rationale. The most expansive view of the pub-
lic purpose rule in condemnation case law is the so-called 
"public advantage" doctrine.40 Yet even under that view, 
an "acquisition which is primarily for private benefit is 
not for a public use."41 Thus, since the definition of spe-
cial assessments advanced by McQuillan stresses the pri-
macy of the private interest in the improvement, this type 
of special assessment fails the public advantage test and 
would appear to be unconstitutional. 
If this discussion sounds too doctrinal, too spiced with 
legal characterizations, put yourself in the place of the 
thirty Mansfield Street dissenters. With them, you might 
say, "There ought to be a law ... " I suggest that the 
problems identified are indeed important, raising issues 
of governmental favoritism (the use of public powers for 
private purposes), and governmental and economic op-
pression (the taking of property as payment for unwanted 
and unrealized benefits). 
Two overall problems have been identified in special 
assessment practice - its limited scope and the unfairness 
which attends its present use. If those inequities were in-
herent in special assessment theory it would be wrong to 
argue that the practice should be expanded. However, l 
believe that at the root of both difficulties is one concep-
tual bind: the idea that special assessments are somehow 
necessarily or expeditiously linked, politically, tempor-
ally and financially, to physical improvements. If, instead, 
one severed that connection, if improvements were fi-
nanced out of general revenues and decided upon in the 
ordinary political process, if assessment were made upon 
realization and not upon ribbon-cutting, and if we spoke 
of assessments and not special assessment financing, then 
perhaps both problems would vanish. More of this below. 
Today, however, special assessment financing recovers 
publicly created betterment to a very limited extent, and 
does so in an unfair manner. 
4 Offset of Special Benefit in Condemnation Proceedings 
The fourth mechanism currently employed to recapture 
publicly created betterment is the offset of special bene-
fits to the remainder which occurs in a partial taking 
situation. 
To illustrate, let us assume that one-half of B's large va-
cant lot was taken by the municipality to use in an urban 
renewal project. In determining the amount of compen-
sation due to B, the authorities will subtract from the 
compensation payable on the land taken the value by 
which the remaining land is "specially" enhanced by the 
urban renewal project. On the other hand, "general bene-
fits" common to all the property in the area of the proj-
ect will not be offset. 
If this sounds both theoretically and practically confus-
ing, it is. One commentator states: 
The underlying reason for the refusal to offset 
damages by general benefits is that a citizen 
whose property is taken should not bear more 
of the cost of the public improvements than 
other property owners whose property is neither 
taken nor damaged. The underlying reason for 
permitting specwl benefits to offset severance 
damages has been placed on the equitable prin-
ciple of preventing unjust enrichment, as well as 
the simple mathematical fact that one is not 
"damaged" to the extent that the resultant bene-
fit offsets a taking-caused loss. 
The real difficulty is in determining which are 
"general" benefits ... and which are "special" 
benefits. A leading treatise on eminent domain 
has stated that there is a greater diversity of 
opinion and more different and inconsistent rules 
on the question of set-off for benefits than on 
any other point in the law of expropriations.42 
Needless to say, little betterment is recovered by a mech-
anism of such limited application. 
5 Subdivision Exactions 
Subdivision is the process by which local government 
supervises the transition of vacant land into developed 
land. This supervision allows the government to control 
the layout of development, so as to assure both efficiency 
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and harmony .43 Typically, localities require that in the 
process of subdivision the landowner/subdivider install 
streets, curbs, storm drains, gutters, sidewalks, water 
mains and sanitary sewers.44 
Such subdivision exactions proceed on a cost rationale. 
It is clear that localities could just as well both supervise 
and pay for these improvements. The fact that the sub-
divider is made to pay is justified in the literature as fair 
because the subdivider, it is said, is the one who by his 
development creates costs for the Iocality.46 
Some betterment is recovered through this device. How-
ever, there is no attempt to relate the recovery to the 
betterment conferred, nor is bettered land treated dif-
ferently from land which is not bettered, or, for that 
matter, from land which might have been worsened in 
the zoning process. 
Moreover, subdivision exactions on residential land. raise 
constitutional questions which a proper betterment 
scheme would avoid. Especially in its more extreme 
forms, such as the requirement of dedication of land for 
school use, the practice of exaction raises the issue of a 
taking of property.47 Also, by placing substantial costs 
on the developer and thereby raising the cost of the hous-
ing he is building, subdivision exactions raise many of 
the constitutional questions now being litigated with 
respect to so-called exclusionary zoning.48 
In summary, the current law results in the recapture of 
very little betterment. The mechanisms which do recap-
ture some of this value were not designed with this func-
tion in mind so it should not be surprising that they 
perform that function in an inadequate, inefficient and 
unfair manner. On the whole, there exists a vacuum of 
betterment recovery in the public sector almost as large 
as that which, at least in terms of non-market solutions, 
exists in the private sector. This conclusion contrasts 
sharply with the concern which we saw that the legal 
system has for worsement compensation, in both the 
public and the private sectors. 
Hypothetical Explanations for the 
Lack of Symmetry between Worsement Compensation 
and Betterment Recovery 
What possible explanation~ are there for the skewed con-
cern of our legal system? Several suggest themselves at 
this stage of the 1malysis. 
1 Compensation Arguably Engages Society's Predominant 
Concern for Protection of Private Property; 
Betterm~nt Recovery Does Not 
When public or private action decreases the value of land, 
we have a zero-sum game: either property owner B, on 
the one hand, loses property, or property owner A or the 
government, on the other, loses property. When such 
action increases the value of land, we have a positive-sum 
game: either B "wins" property and no one loses, or A 
or the government "win" property and no one loses, or 
else B and A or B and the government share and no one 
loses. 
Perhaps the law should be more concerned about a situa-
tion involving the allocation of property loss than one in 
which only the allocation of a windfall is at stake. This 
concern is especially appropriate in a zero-sum situation 
in which government power is arrayed against a private 
individual, that is, an arguable taking of property. 
2 Betterment Recovery Entails an Incentive Problem 
The lure of profit is the force which makes a market 
work. Can it be argued that betterment recovery, unlike 
worsement compensation, would reduce that force sig-
nificantly? 
Certainly much would depend on the recovery mechan-
ism proposed. An owner will only sell his land for de-
velopment if he can obtain for it more than it is worth 
to him in its existing use. If for some reason all the extra 
value is taken away from him he will not be willing to 
make the land available and the market will break down. 
Not all recovery schemes will necessarily have this effect; 
but this problem does limit the type of mechanisms 
which can be proposed. 
The most that can be said at this point is that the in-
centive problem is one with which any betterment re-
covery scheme must deal. 
3 Worsement May Fall Unevenly, 
While Betterment May Spread Evenly 
Certainly public action which decreases the value of land 
does fall unevenly. Such action is sporadic in time and 
place and may fall very heavily. Given the present politi-
cal process, it may fall especially heavily on the poor (e.g. 
urban renewal and highway development). Whether pri-
vate action which has the same effect is more evenly dis-
tributed among the population is difficult to assess. 
If private action which increases land values occurred in 
such a way that those increases were evenly spread, then 
recovery would be inefficient. Everyone would be as well 
off without, as with, the recovery effort which itself en-
tails transaction costs. If public action took this same 
pattern, the effect would be more complex. If public 
revenues derived from a similarly spread source (i.e., one 
taxpayer-one dollar), then recovery would change noth-
ing. However, if revenue derived from a progressive 
source, then recovery would have a regressive effect on 
the redistribution of income, assuming that the recovered 
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If worsement did indeed fall unevenly and betterment 
did spread evenly, it would explain why we compensate 
worsement but do not recover betterment. 
There is little information available which might verify 
or belie the pattern hypothesized. One might well ask, 
however, why public action which increases land values 
should take a less uneven pattern then public action 
which decreases those values. Both spring from the same 
sources: zoning, transportation, renewal, and other simi-
lar land use decisions. 
4 Worsement Compensation May Be More Politically 
Acceptable Than Betterment Recovery 
Worsement Compensation works a transfer of revenue 
from the taxpayers to the injured party. Betterment 
recovery would take value from the bettered party and 
give it to the taxpayer. If every taxpayer had an equal 
probability of being both worsened and bettered, com-
pensation and recovery would be equally acceptable. 
However, if the taxpayers and the people likely to be 
bettered and worsened were different classes of people, 
then this congruence of interest would not hold. That is, 
if it were only the left-handed people who owned land, 
whereas everyone paid taxes, the left-handed people 
would vote for worsement compensation, but their short-
term self-interest appears to oppose betterment recovery. 
To the extent that land ownership is concentrated, to 
that extent political opposition to betterment recovery 
will be felt. And to the extent that such concentration is 
congruent with the politically powerful, that opposition 
will be stiff. 
5 The Administrative Costs Involved in 
Betterment Recovery May Be Larger Than 
Those Involved in Worsement Compensation 
Administrative costs in this context include the cost of 
measurement of betterment and worsement and the costs 
of the transfer process. Betterment measurement requires 
two figures, the value of the land before the public or 
private action affected it and the value of the land after 
the benefit was accrued. If the taking is full, compensa-
tion measurement requires only the first figure. If the 
compensation is partial, then both the original value and 
the value after the partial taking must be known. 
However, if we apply the concept of realization to bet-
terment recovery (as we must in order to avoid taxing 
paper gains), the betterment measurement is a good deal 
less expensive than the partial taking measure. This is be-
cause we might delay recovery and measurement until 
disposition, either by way of sale or development. If dis-
position were by sale, then the price would provide a 
benchmark; if by development, appraisal would be pos-
sible, just as is done with reminders in a partial taking. 
Moreover, betterment measurement would be consider-
ably easier than offset measurement, which requires 
three figures, including that of betterment.49 
Two complications make the picture just painted less 
rosy. First, the delay in time between the creation of 
betterment and its recovery, which is inherent in the no-
tion of realization, may make more difficult the assess-
ment of the benefit which was occasioned by the public 
force. In the interval, many market factors may be at 
work. The most obvious and perhaps easiest to handle is 
inflation. But there may be several public and private 
actions influencing the value of B's land between the 
time zone change and his decision to sell. A measurement 
of betterment which was designed to separate out these 
effects might be costly. Second, I have been comparing 
the costs of betterment measurement to those of partial 
taking and offset measurement. This comparison is in a 
sense unfair. Partial takings and takings involving offsets 
are not regular occurrences, whereas a measure of better-
ment may be necessary to every betterment recovery. 
Worsement compensation most often involves full takings, 
for which the measurement cost is less expensive than 
betterment measurement. 
So far we have been discussing measurement costs. Bet-
terment recovery and worsement compensation also in-
volve administrative costs such as the cost of an appeals 
process and of the transfer itself. Little work has been 
done on these costs as they relate to condemnation pro-
ceedings. The administrative costs involved in recovering 
betterment are problematic: It should be remembered 
that these costs (whatever their weight) also exist in 
worsement compensation, but they are deemed justifiable. 
At this point, it is enough to recognize that this is an open 
question. I shall return to it. · 
A betterment recovery vacuum exists today. The four 
most persuasive explanations arising for this vacuum from 
the preliminary inquiry concern the administrative costs 
of recovery. The probable political opposition to recovery, 
the positive sum nature of betterment and the incentive 
problem. These factors may be said to represent the diffi-
culties of betterment recovery, which any recovery 
scheme would seek to minimize. I now move on to analy-
sis of the benefits of such action. 
II The Case for Betterment Recovery in the Public Arena 
There are six reasons why betterment should be recovered 
when it is created by public action. 
1 Betterment Recovery Would Allow for 
Just Worsement Compensation 
As observed, it is a constitutional imperative that worse-
ment created by public action be compensated. This im-
perative arises from the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution (a guarantee which is repeated in the 
constitution of every State but two): 
" ... nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation." 
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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
makes this Fifth Amendment guarantee applicable to the 
acquisition of property by the states.50 
The most important concept in the Fifth Amendment for 
the purposes of the present discussion is "just compensa-
tion." Commentators have noted that" ... courts have 
been hesitant to break new ground when dealing with the 
just compensation phrase ... " 51 The compensation re-
quired has long been defined as the cash price that would 
be agreed on at a voluntary sale between an owner and a 
buyer both willing but not obligated to sell. So-called 
incidental losses are not compensated.52 
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
Report Number l 07, "New Approaches to Compensation 
for Residential Takings," (sponsored by the American 
Association of State Highway Officials in cooperation 
with the Federal Highway Administration) is an analysis 
of eminent domain law as it applies to highway develop-
ment. The Report, published in 1970, concludes that re-
cent developments "have converged to highlight their 
[the rules of eminent domain law) inadequacy."53 As 
seen by the Report, those developments include the 
"great increase in land acquisitions at all levels of govern-
ment,"54 the critical housing shortage which exists today, 
and rising public expectations concerning welfare. 
If the American Association of State Highway Officials 
and the Federal Highway Administration believe that 
compensation is inadequate, can we doubt that it is? The 
truth is that legal commentators have been saying this for 
years,55 and their criticisms of the process go beyond 
those of the "highwaymen." 
- Consider that we measure the value of the taking by 
looking at the value of the property as if it were on the 
market. What, we ask, would it bring if the owner wanted 
to sell? We ignore the fact that the owner does not want 
to sell. There is no compensation for the loss of the sub-
jective values which a home represents. While this same 
practice holds in other contexts in which damages are 
determined (i.e. personal value is not awarded), there · 
may be a significant distinction between tort and con-
tract actions between private parties, and condemnation 
actions in which an individual faces government power. 
Most obviously, the government is under constitutional 
compµlsion to compensate adequately. Also the very 
function of private property may point toward a differ-
ent resolution in conflicts b.etween the individuals on the 
one hand and between government and a citizen on the 
other.56 
- Consider, too, the more objective stakes which a family 
has in its home and which, although there is·some recog-
nition in the law of their existence, go uncompensated. 
The ability to establish roots in a community is the key 
to the enjoyment of fundamental rights. Access to educa-
tion for children, to employment opportunities, to the 
electoral process, and to the benefits of other public 
services all depend on residence. The Supreme Court has 
often recognized the link between rights in services and 
residence - for example, Gomillion v. lightfoot, 57 
Edwards v. California, 58 and Shapiro v. Thompson. 59 
Perhaps for this reason, housing seems to have occupied 
a favored position in the case law. See, for example, 
Buchanan v. Wharley, 60 Shelley v. Kraemer, 61 and 
Reitman v. Mulkey. 62 But the eminent domain case law 
does not respond to these interests. These costs are 
lumped under the doctrinal umbrella of"incidental costs." 
This interest in "rootedness" has been recognized by Con-
gress to some extent in the context of compensatory leg-
islation. The relocation requirements of the National 
Housing Act63 and the Uniform Relocation Assistance 
and Lands Acquisition Policies Act of 197064 provide 
some relief, but not nearly enough.65 
Other, substantial damages are similarly non-compensable. 
Marc Fried considered the loss "incident" to forced reloca-
tion in Boston; he titled his research "Grieving for a Lost 
Home."66 As one commentator has stated: 
It is certainly not difficult to conclude that the 
fair market value test creates substantial injustice 
when the family homestead is being taken and 
no replacement property is available, or when a 
black or poor white family has paid off a home 
in a ghetto and cannot find comparable shelter 
for the small price they receive for their home. 67 
These substantial, though legally "incidental" damages are 
not limited to residential takings. As Professor Willis 
Rokes states: 
... these losses can be of major importance to a 
dispossessed property owner. If he is required to 
abandon a profitable business, he may incur 
many types of consequential expenses in relocat-
ing it. Contract rights are destroyed, and profits 
are lost during the moving. It takes time to build 
up the new business to its former position; mean-
while, competitors move in and take his custo-
mers. He may be unable to find a new location 
because of zoning restrictions, and even if he is 
successful in his search, the costs of moving his 
business may cause him great hardship or even 
financial ruin. 68 
Gimbel's and Macy's don't get condemned. The concern 
here is for the small businessman who, given the current 
state of the law, may well have to go to work for Gimbel's 
or Macy's after condemnation. 
- Consider, in a typical condemnation proceeding, the 
need for an attorney and that under the "going arrange-
ment the attorney's fee is from one-third to one-half of 
the amount by which the final award exceeds the last 
offer."69 This fact leads to a sad state of affairs, as de-
scribed by a commentator: 
Public officials, including negotiators for con-
demnors, are well aware of the burden that an 
attorney's fee places upon the recalcitrant land-
owner, and it is not at all unusual for them to 
exploit this obstacle to litil(ation to force the 
201 
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landowner to settle out of court. Indeed, recent 
studies have shown that in many instances the 
first offer is less than the condemning agency's 
own appraisal. As reprehensible as this conduct 
may appear, it is not as deplorable as another 
practice that is sometimes used. The landowner 
may be given a firm offer, told that it is a 'take 
it or leave it' proposition, and notified that it is 
the agency's intention to deposit less than the 
firm offer in court if the offer is rejected.~ 
- Consider, finally, the narrowness with which the word 
"taking" has been interpreted: 
It is now an almost universally accepted doctrine 
that ... when the devotion of land to the use for 
which it was taken injuriously affects neighbor-
ing land, in a manner that would be actionable 
at common law if the injury had been committed 
by a private individual without legislative sanc-
tion, but does not substantially oust the owner 
from the possession or deprive him of all bene-
ficial use thereof, the owner of the injured land 
is not entitled to compensation under the con-
stitution; for mere!~ damaging property does not 
constitute a taking. 1 
These limitations combine to make the compensation 
presently dispensed far from full. 
This result must be evaluated in light of the central im-
portance of the Fifth Amendment guarantee. Professor 
Charles Reich's thinking is cogent: 
The institution called property guards the 
troubled boundary between individual man and 
the state. It is not the only guardian; many other 
institutions, laws and practices serve as well. 
But in a society that chiefly values material well-
being, the power to control a particular portion 
of that well-being is the very foundation of 
individuality ... 
... while the Bill of Rights comes into play only 
at extraordinary mom en ts of conflict or crisis, 
property affords day-to-day protection in the 
ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final anal-
ysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the exis-
tence of private property. Political rights pre-
suppose that individuals and private groups have 
the will and the means to act independently. But 
so long as individuals are motivated by self-inter-
est, their well-being must first be independent. 
Civil liberties must have a basis in pr~erty, or 
bills of rights will not preserve them. 
Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark also has empha-
sized the importance of the Fifth Amendment: "There is 
no more vital concept in the Constitution, for it protects 
the citizen in his property, and freedom cannot exist in a 
propertyless state." 73 To the extent that government 
can take private property and compensate inadequately 
for that taking, independence of the kind Professor Reich 
and Mr. Clark speak of is undermined. 
The legal profession has come to recognize that compen-
sation practices are not just.74 A short survey of the solu-
tions which have been suggested will reveal the radical 
nature of the felt need to change. 
The highway lobby, in the Program Report cited above, 
makes the following recommendations: Change the com-
pensation formula to " ... the highest price that the prop-
erty could reasonably be expected to bring if exposed for 
sale in the open market for a reasonable time;"75 allow 
additional compensation for certain incidental losses 
under a statutory scheme which would isolate and value 
certain major items and under a claims procedure where 
the actual loss exceeded the statutory valuation; and pro-
vide for replacement housing and the reform of the valu-
ation process, including the elimination of bargaining and 
the institution of full disclosure by the appraiser. 
Several commentators have recommended removing emi-
nent domain proceedings from the courts. Indeed, several 
states have established permanent arbitration tribunals 
staffed with expert personnel as an alternative to judicial 
eminent domain proceedings.76 Moreover, the federal 
statutes identified above also represent a movement away 
from the courts in this area, as do certain of the recom-
mendations of the highway people. This movement entails 
the delegation of the administration, if not the content, 
of a constitutional right from the courts to the legislature. 
That thought gives one pause. 
Professor Michelman is one of those who favors this kind 
of solution. He states that the legislature " ... can im-
pose a useful fairness discipline which eludes the grasp of 
the courts," 77 and points to the federal legislation in the 
area of highway relocation. Michelman points to four 
institutional limitations which make judicial proceedings 
inadequate. First, " ... the over-arching generality ... of 
the fairness principle is [such) ·that it effectively prevents 
courts from proceeding by the use of categories and pre-
sumptions. "78 Yet, is the problem any greater in this 
area than it is in other areas of constitutional interpreta-
tion (e.g., "equal protection")? In fact, the formula sub-
mitted by the Project Report is one such set of "categories 
and presumptions." 
Michelman's second point is that the generality of the 
standard of fairness results in a " ... loss of effect on the 
political decision-making process itself."79 What Michel-
man seems to mean by this is that today, because com-
pensation decisions are made by the judiciary, the legis-
lature begs off the fairness question when it fashions pol-
icy, relying on the courts to pick up the pieces. Yet what 
evidence do we have that would lead us to the conclusion 
that if compensation were left in the hands of the legisla-
ture the result would be more satisfactory, that the legis-
lature would build full compensation into its policies? 
Can we trust the policy-makers to weigh and compensate 
for the costs generated by the policies they make? Is it 
not against just such an assumption that the Constitution 
stands? 
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Michelman also stresses that judges do not have the same 
access to information that legislators have. This comment 
implies a rather administrative definition of constitutional 
rights; this type of argument can be made to justify many 
encroachments on constitutional liberties. Insofar, however, 
that it points to the existence of other types of constraints 
on judicial action, I would agree that such an emphasis is 
waranted. I will elaborate on this below. 
Michelman's last point concerns the inability of courts to 
fashion settlements. Professor Michelman defines his goal 
as a" ... collective decision making procedure which ... 
seeks to assure that political bargaining by unreservedly 
self-interested actors would distribute benefits and bur-
dens 'evenly' or within whatever tolerances fairness ad-
mits."80 If we doubt the "evenness" of the distribution 
of benefits and burdens produced by logrolling, the judi-
ciary is seen to be more likely than is the legislature to 
produce fair results. For surely the judiciary is less in-
volved in this "unreservedly self-interested" logrolling 
process than is the legislature. More importantly, how 
can the legislature be trusted to maintain the fundamen-
tally important boundary which protects the indepen-
dence of the citizenry from that same legislature? Michel-
man's institutional analysis has overlooked the prime 
institutional difference - the court is the least dangerous 
branch.81 
A third, and perhaps the most extreme recommendation 
is that which follows from Professor Sax's criticism of 
the eminent domain case law. Sax believes that its muddled 
state - which he says" ... has advanced only slightly 
since the Supreme Court began to struggle with the prob-
lem some eighty years ago"82 - is explained not by in-
stitutional factors but by the absence of a sound economic 
definition of property rights. His sweeping conceptual 
remedy, the notion that "public rights may be vindicated 
without compulsory compensation,"83 is a testament to 
the deep unrest of scholars in the field and has profound 
implications for the practice of compensation by public 
agencies. 
According to Sax, public rights exist whenever" ... com-
peting resource-users [land-owners and/or the government] 
seek ... to make a use that involves some imposition ... 
on [each other] and those demands are in conflict. " 84 
The broad scope of these public rights is illustrated by 
one of Sax's examples: 
Assume a situation in which there is, on a long 
coastline, only a single bay suitable for naval 
purposes, and the navy wishes to have use of the 
bay for its ships. Assume, furthermore, that the 
bay cannot be used for both naval and civilian 
ships. May a law be constitutionally enacted pro-
viding, without compensation, that the bay be 
closed to all civilian ships? It may, for the bay, 
being a common, may be allocated to one, rather 
than another, competing interest.85 
Such a view of the Fifth Amendment goes a long way 
toward undermining the function which Professor Reich 
spoke of. It is part of an on-the-cheap approach to environ-
mental protection which threatens other, at least equally 
important values. 
I want to argue now that these various proposals for solv-
ing the eminent domain problem simply will not effect 
"just compensation." What the courts need to protect 
Fifth Amendment rights is not instruction in economic 
theory and the use of legal concepts or directives to em-
ploy more generous compensation formulae, but adequate 
public funds to draw on in administering public com-
pensation. 
A large part of the problem with the current "taking" doc-
trine stems from the fact that courts perceive large eco-
nomic and political constraints on their actions. The eco-
nomic constraint exists in the form of limits on the size 
of the public revenue pie. For while condemnation is iso-
lated in time and space and, therefore, political pressure 
from property-owners is diffuse, the political consequences 
of a judicially-increased compensation bill can be intense 
in their impact upon public policy. 
The holding zone is an example. We saw the way one 
court treated this practice in Aronson, in which a mini-
mum lot area requirement of 100,000 square feet was 
invalidated as a taking of property. Yet while Aronson is 
a sore thumb in the case law, holding zones are common 
enough in practice.86 In most cases, the zoning authority 
is not attempting, as in Aronson, to provide recreational 
land; rather it desires to prevent leapfrogging develop-
ment and the costs commonly associated with the word 
"sprawl," or it wants to assure a secure tax base well into 
the future and therefore considerably overzones for in-
dustry or zones exorbitantly large-lot residential, planning 
to rezone industrial when the appropriate decade comes. 
Behind this facade are legitimate and important planning 
objectives. Yet the practice effectively denies to the owner 
the use of his land. If a court should hold that holding 
zones constitute a taking of property, the compensation 
bill would be very large and the likelihood is that it would 
not be paid. Instead, the zoning authority would have to 
discontinue its holding zone practice, thereby abandoning 
some important public policies. Faced with the prospect 
of non-payment or large and unfortunate policy conse-
quences, the courts avoid these difficulties by calling the 
public action something other than a"taking of property," 
or by framing rules which result in less-than-adequate 
compensation. 
Betterment recovery would take the judiciary off the 
horns of this dilemma. Betterment recovered could be 
earmarked so that it would be used for compensation 
purposes, perhaps by means of a trust fund device. In 
this way, betterment recovery would increase the amount 
of money available for worsement compensation, thereby 
loosening the economic and political constraints which 
presently inhibit judicial movement in this area. It would 
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enable courts to hold that a taking had in fact occurred 
and to order "just compensation" without endangering 
the continuance of the public action in general. 
This is not to say that there is some inherent and neces-
sary connection between worsement compensation and 
betterment recovery. We might, for example, use general 
revenue funds to accomplish''just compensation." How-
ever, we have not done this to date, and the likelihood is 
that we will not do this. It appears not to be politically 
viable. Betterment recovery, therefore, is a device for 
breaking the political logjam; it employs the trust fund 
theory of public finance: to fund x, find a source of 
revenue which looks sufficiently like x so that one can 
argue that a conduit flowing from that revenue to x is 
only reasonable. Although this kind of reasoning can be 
pushed to absurd extremes, this does not appear to be 
the case with respect to betterment recovery and worse-
ment compensation. The former is often very practically 
linked to the latter. One governmental action may occa-
sion both betterment and worsement. Witness the differ-
ential impact of a highway on land values, depending on 
whether the property in question is located adjacent to 
or in the path of the highway, or several blocks away, or 
at an interchange. The connection between betterment 
and worsement exists. 
This analysis suggests that hypothetical one, in which I 
argued that it might be possible to distinguish between 
worsement compensation and betterment recovery be-
cause the former is a zero-sum situation and the latter 
positive-sum,s7 is misconceived. If the absence of better-
ment recovery "causes" worsement compensation to be 
inadequate, then the two are very much linked, and laml-
owner B, whose property is worsened by public action, 
should be very concerned that landowner C, whose prop-
erty is enhanced because of public action, not retain that 
increase in value. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
betterment recovery has some effect in keeping down 
market values of land.ss To the extent that th is occurs. 
whatever basis is chosen for the payment of compensa-
tion becomes more viable. 
It also suggests that hypothetical four, in which I argued 
that a concentration of land-ownership would cause polit-
ical opposition to betterment recovery ,s9 may be some-
what overstated. Because betterment recovery will make 
worsement compensation more adequate, to that extent 
it serves the interests of the landowning class. 
Betterment recovery is not a substitute for reform of the 
Fifth Amendment case law. However, if the analysis is 
correct, it is a necessary precondition to such reform. 
And whatever our notions of institutional behavior and 
competence are, betterment recovery earmarked for 
worsement compensation would necessarily make the 
Fifth Amendment guarantee of "just compensation'' 
more of a reality than it is today. 
2 Betterment Recovery Would Make Public Decisions 
Concerning Land Use More Rational 
Public intervention in the land market (via zoning, im-
provements, etc.) must inevitably be distorted by the 
absence of betterment recovery. Today, the government 
to some extent compensates people whose land is 
worsened by its actions and it does not recover the bene-
fits it confers on those whose land is bettered by those 
actions. This describes the classic situation in which the 
failure to internalize costs and benefits results in ineffi-
cient allocation. Professor Sax describes one of the 
dynamics in this way: 
The prevailing view of compensation law has a 
considerable practical effect on resource alloca-
tion, since the prospect of having to pay com-
pensation is a constraint on government regula-
tion of private property. Though it may be 
desirable, in terms of maximizing the net prod-
uct of the aggregate resource base, to undertake 
a particular restriction on the use of private prop· 
erty, compelled compensation may deter a 
legislature from enacting the restriction.9() 
To illustrate, take the hypothetical case of a highway de-
cision. The road can be built either in an area in which 
the compensation bill (under current case law) is high or 
in an area in which the bill is low. Planning criteria (in 
terms of an overall plan, social, economic and demo-
graphic) point to the former area as the rational choice. 
However, officials may well decide not to locate the road 
there because of the larger compensation payment which 
would be required. If, however, a betterment recovery 
scheme existed, the bill could be paid, in full, from the 
compensation trust fund. Moreover, betterment recovery 
would also allow the decision-makers to consider the now 
internalized benefits which the road would create. 
Thus betterment recovery would lead to better land use 
decision-making by governments, in that those decisions 
would be informed by the full weight of the costs and 
benefits which they would generate. 
3 Betterment Recovery Would Redress Inequities Which 
Result from Present Public Land Use Activity 
Hypothesize an urban renewal project. On the east, abut-
ting B's vacant lot, is new commercial and office develop-
ment; on the west, abutting C's residential development, 
is the power plant. B is allowed to retain the value incre-
ment created, but C, because of the limits of eminent 
domain Jaw, may or may not be compensated for the 
worsement created. If the renewal plan had reversed the 
location of the uses, the effect on B and C would have 
been reversed. In what sense does C, whether restored to 
his original position or not, "deserve" to be in such a dif-
ferent position from B, who retains his windfall? 
Part of this inequity is caused by inadequate compensa-
tion to C. Another part is caused by the fact that Bis 
able to retain the betterment conferred on his land, with-
out having earned it. In relation to government action he 
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has borne no risk in holding the land any greater than the 
partial loss he might have incurred through inadequate 
compensation following government condemnation. 
Without getting too deeply into a discussion of the phil-
osophy of value, can. we not say that when the ordinary 
citizen perceives that an identifiable governmental action 
has "created" betterment and worsement, as with Band C, 
that citizen also perceives that the fairest solution would 
be for B to give some of his windfall gain to C? The alter-
native is for the taxpayer to recompense C and for B to 
retain the gain, which also has come from the taxpayer's 
pocket. Perhaps because of the limited scale of land use . 
planning in this country today, these arguments are heard 
from only a small number of land-owners and academi-
cians. This can be traced to the incremental nature of 
planning - complaints, like interventions, are isolated in 
time and space. 
Betterment recovery would recover a substantial amount 
of B's windfall gain and give it to C, thereby putting them 
in more equal positions. 
4 Betterment Recovery Would Substantially Decrease 
Corruption in Public Land Use Decision-Making 
Until this point, I have spoken of "land values," now I 
shall talk about "money." There is a lot of money riding 
on governmental decisions in the land market. Take 
zoning decisions, for example: 
A good illustration of the impact of zoning can 
be found in Wayne, New Jersey, 20 miles west 
of the Lincoln Tunnel. There, the value of an 
acre of land has risen from about $ 700 to as 
much as $90,000 as the township's population 
grew from 12,000 in 1950 to 49,000 in 1970. 
But the top value of that acre depends on zon-
ing - an acre worth $90,000 today for high-
density use like office building or garden apart-
ments is worth only $ l 0,000 if it's zoned for 
one single-family home. "The power to zone is 
the power to make millionaires," said Lee Ed-
ward Koppelman, the director of the Nassau-
Suffolk Regional Planning Board.91 
One way to get a sense of the incentives at work is to look 
at the lengths to which developers and owners go to ob-
tain rezoning. This is somewhat reflected in the volume 
of zoning litigation that exists in state courts. For example, 
of 140 cases decided by the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut in 1966-67 term, 33, or 24 percent, were zoning de-
cisions. Negligence decisions represented the second larg-
est category; there were 18 such cases.92 
Although there has been very little research into the phe-
nomenon, it is commonly suggested that developers and 
owners do more than merely litigate in order to affect 
these decisions. Surely factors favorable to "corruption 
are present: a highly decentralized decision-making process 
with a minimum of judicial oversight in terms of scope of 
review, a lot of money at stake, and intensely political 
actors (generally local party officials). Marion Clawson of 
Resources for the Future states: 
No one thinks that planning and zoning actions 
are free of pressures - individual, group, and 
political. In some cases, something of tangible 
value accrues to planning and zoning officials 
when they act in certain ways. Outright bribery 
is not unknown but is less prevalent than might 
be expected in view of the sums involved ... As 
long as present zoning methodology continues, 
suspicion of improper action will persist.93 
Some idea of the process, but not the scale, of these prac-
tices has recently come to light. The New Jersey State 
Commission on Investigations held public hearings on 
September 19 and 20, 1972, into the subject of corrup-
tion in the zoning process. I will briefly relate one of the 
stories told to the Commission in order to convey the 
flavor of the "transaction." 
Mr. McDonald wanted to develop a shopping center in 
Hillsborough, New Jersey. His property was zoned agri-
cultural, so he applied for a change in zone. After making 
the application, and after the planning commission had 
decided to recommend approval to the zoning commis-
sion (a political body entrusted with the final decision), 
Mr. McDonald stepped into the office of the Mayor of 
Hillsborough, Mr. Guerrara, for a chat. I pick up the testi-
mony at that point: 
A ... I went to Mr. Guerrera, 1 wanted his guid-
ance as the best way to proceed ... When I'd go 
into town, I'd stop into his office ... I asked 
him, 1 said, "John, we've gone this far. Now, 
what's it going to take to get this project com-
pleted?" He told, me it was - first of all, he said 
he'd have to talk to the boys. 
Q Talk to the boys? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did he identify "the boys?" 
A No, sir, he did not. 
Q Did he say what he had to talk to the boys about? 
A No, sir, he didn't ... 
Q Well, what was your purpose in going to his office, 
sir? 
A Well, I'd stop by just to find out how things 
were progressing and if we had any problems. If 
I had a problem I would tell him about it. Like I 
found out that if we got twenty per cent of the 
neighbors would object, then we would need 
two-thirds majority of the council's vote ... 
When 1 come back to him again after he talked 
to the boys, he told me that the project was 
probably going to take five big ones. 
Q Five big ones? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you know what he meant by that? 
A Yes, sir, it was very clear. $5,000. 
Q Well, what was your reply to Mr. Guerrera at this 
time? 
A 1 was a little bit befuddled at this point. 1 don't 
think I replied to him at all immediately, and 
then 1 told him, 1 says, "Are we talking about 
$5,000?" He said, "Yes." And that's when the 
cat was out of the bag, so to speak. 94 
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One cannot know how much under-the-table betterment 
"recovery" does take place. One could, however, substan-
tially reduce the incentive for corruption by making the 
recovery public and removing much of the windfall - in 
other words, by recovering betterment. 
5 Betterment Recovery Is a Necessary Precondition for 
Large-Scale Public Initiative in the Land Market 
Many authorities believe that public intervention in the 
land market must be increased dramatically if we are to 
cope with many of our large environmental and social 
problems.95 Given the current legal framework, specific-
ally the absence of betterment recovery, this develop-
ment is unlikely to occur. The more public intervention 
there is in the land market, the more worsement and 
betterment is created. The more worsement and better-
ment there is, the more acute the problems of inadequate 
compensation, inequity, planning distortion, and corrup-
tion become. The political process is quite unlikely to 
sanction a movement which has these consequences. 
Perhaps this dynamic is one of the reasons why this coun-
try has not moved with greater alacrity towards land use 
planning. As will be discussed, one of the first steps which 
the British took when, just after World War Two, they 
decided to implement comprehensive land use planning, 
was to adopt a betterment recovery scheme. 
6 Betterment Recovery May Serve as a Source of 
General-Purpose Revenue 
It has already been suggested that betterment recovery is 
a source of revenue for the purpose of worsement com-
pensation. 
Betterment recovery might exceed worsement compen-
sation and thereby be freed for other use if one of two 
conditions applied. First, the government might recover 
both publicly and privately created betterment. Second, 
publicly created betterment itself might be much larger 
than publicly created worsement, so much so that its sub-
stantial recovery would leave a surplus in the fund after 
compensation had been made. Although there is little 
empirical evidence on this last point, one might speculate 
that, overall, public intervention raises land values to a 
considerable extent. If we assume that most land is held 
by the politically powerful, this may be the result of 
political factors. Or, in a more generous sense of "polit-
ical,"we might say that the political process intervenes 
to better the general welfare and succeeds much more 
often than not. 
For present purposes it suffices to say, with Professor 
Self, that " ... at least it is reasonable to argue that the 
State ought not to make an actual loss"96 out of its ac-
tivities in the land market. Yet that is the situation today, 
in which compensation is paid (although inadequately) 
for costs inflicted but the benefits conferred are not 
recovered. 
Betterment recovery would allow compensation to be-
come just; it would make public land-use decisions more 
rational; it would redress inequities which are caused by 
its absence; it would substantially decrease corruption in 
the public land-use decision-making process; it would 
make it possible for officials to contemplate comprehen-
sive land-use schemes; it would offset revenues currently 
used for purposes of compensation and might serve as an 
additional source of general-purpose revenue. For these 
reasons, betterment, at least when created by public ac-
tion, should be recaptured. 
III The Extent and Methods of Betterment Recovery 
Given the conclusion that the public should recapture 
the betterment it creates, two questions arise. Do we also 
want the public to recapture betterment which is argu-
ably created by private parties in the land market? How 
should recovery, of whatever scope, be achieved so as to 
minimize the costs of the process?97 With respect to this 
second question, there are two primary modes of recover-
ing betterment. One is to tax the betterment once cre-
ated. The other is to build into the process of betterment 
creation devices for immediately recapturing betterment 
for the public. This latter technique can only be used 
where betterment is created by discrete institutional acts 
onto which these recapture devices can be grafted in ad-
vance - that is by actions of public agencies. 
Thus there are three major choices of betterment recovery 
devices available: the recovery of all betterment via a tax 
device; recovery of only publicly created betterment via a 
tax device; recovery of only publicly created betterment 
by means of a variety of discrete mechanisms. 
A Public Recovery of All Betterment by Means of a Tax 
The case for public recovery of all value increments is 
commonly associated with Henry George.98 Although 
George's ideas went considerably beyond notions of 
betterment recovery, one of his ideas is central to this 
argument: that there can be no distinction between pub-
licly and privately created betterment. In a sense fore-
shadowing Coase, George thought that one could not say 
that A's shopping center "improved" B's gas station; rather, 
the increase in value associated.with that development 
has been created by a complex of factors, public and 
private. George identified this complex as "society." 
The ideological and ethical nature of this argument is ob-
vious in George's writing. That tone is reflected in the 
most recent of the many revivals of Georgist thinking, 
the dissenting opinion in the National Commission on 
Urban Problems (Douglas Commission) on the subject of 
taxation of land values: 
The statistics (concerning land values in Pitts-
burgh) ..• are the clincher ... whereas bare land 
values amounted to $269 billion in 1956, they 
had amounted by 1966 to $523 billion. This 
meant that they had virtually doubled in 10 
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years, and had experienced average yearly in-
crease of$ 25 billion ... Other reliable sources 
show land values rising even faster in some States 
such as California. 
The owners of the land received these enormous 
gains without strain or effort on their part. They 
owned a relatively scarce and limited asset which 
acquired more and more value as population 
grew and as the gross national product increased. 
The progress of society created these values; the 
owners of the land received them.99 
A convincing refutation of this notion of publicly-created 
value has not appeared.100 As the dissenters stated: 
Such a discussion is now muted for a variety of 
reasons. When the issue is raised, the cynics com-
monly dismiss it by saying, "Oh, that is the single 
tax" or "that is Henry George," as though by 
labeling the proposal they had somehow refuted 
or disposed of it. 101 
A few observations can be made, however. 
First, neither the advocates nor the critics of universal 
land increment recovery (or taxation) ever really analyze 
their first assumption, that there is no real distinction be-
tween publicly created betterment and privately created 
betterment. They speak only of"increment." I will at-
tempt to show that there are important distinctions be-
tween the two, which relate to the impact and goals of a 
betterment recovery program. 
Second, the proposal to recover all value increments would 
probably face stiff political opposition. Privately created 
betterment is surely a more widespread phenomenon than 
publicly created betterment. Land-owners will no doubt 
object that they would be seriously damaged by such a 
recapture. Since recapture of only publicly created better-
ment ·is a more marginal change, it should encounter less 
opposition. 
Third, some universal land tax advocates have argued that 
such a scheme would do everything from eliminating · 
slums to stopping urban sprawl. As observed, these argu-
ments have been used as straw men by opponents of uni-
versal recovery. A cogent response must take on the more 
rational claims of the Douglas dissenters: "What we advo-
cate is much more modest, namely that within a general 
system of taxation a special effort should be made for" 
society to recapture for itself an appreciable share of the 
values which it has created," 102 where "it" refers to what 
I have termed botl. publicly and privately created better-
ment. SpecificalJy, the dissenters recommended a 40 per 
cent tax on the increase in all land values, to be levied 
upon every transfer of land.103 
The question remains: should a betterment recovery de-
vice recapture all value increment or only that increment 
"created" by public action? More basically, is there a dif-
ference between the two? There are two arguments for 
the proposition that there are important distinctions be-
tween "publicly-created" betterment and "privately-
created" betterment. 
1 The Recapture of All Betterment May Entail a More 
Serious Incentive Problem than Would the Recapture of 
Only Publicly Created Betterment 
As noted, any betterment recovery scheme involves an 
incentive problem. Universal betterment recovery would 
entail a larger problem of this type than would recovery 
only of publicly created betterment, for two reasons. First, 
a universal recovery would apply to all transactions in the 
land market; a recovery mechanism limited to publicly 
created betterment would apply to a relatively small num-
ber of transactions, i.e., those involving governmental ac-
tion. (However, it is possible to argue that the incentive 
difficulty here can be better overcome by varying the tax 
rate, rather than by altering the incidence of the tax itself.) 
Second, there are factors which may, in individual cases, 
make the disincentive from betterment recovery less of a 
problem with respect to publicly-created betterment than 
privately-created betterment. 
The disincentive problem with recovery of privately cre-
ated betterment can be illustrated by returning to an 
earlier hypothetical. A's shopping center would increase 
the value of B's land. I suggested above that A may well 
be able to"bribe" B to pay A in part for that increase in 
value. Or, A may be able to buy Bout and recover the full 
amount of the betterment. To the extent that this occurs, 
A is able to internalize the benefits "he creates." We do 
not know the extent of this internalization. Universal 
betterment recovery would affect both A, the initiator of 
the development, and B, to the extent that A can internal-
ize the value increment. 
In the case of publicly created betterment, it is generally 
the government which is the initiator. Yet any disincen-
tive to the government which operates via the mechanism 
of recovering publicly-created betterment from those 
economic interest-groups that had lobbied for the public 
action, is offset by a new factor: that any such recovery 
will simultaneously serve to lubricate public action, by 
acting as a budgetary counterweight to the compensation 
load. 
For these reasons, limiting betterment recovery to the 
recovery of publicly created betterment may well reduce 
the incentive problem. 
2 Privately Created Betterment May Spread Evenly, 
while Publicly Created Betterment May Not, 
thus Justifying Recovery only of the Latter 
I hypothesized above from the analogy of public worse-
ment, that publicly created betterment falls unevenly. 104 
If this is correct, and if privately created betterment fell 
evenly, then only the recovery of publicly created better-
ment would be efficient, except with respect to the re-
distributional consequences which would occur if the 
revenue source were skewed. 
207 
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How ought one to begin to answer the question whether 
private betterment falls evenly or not? Such betterment 
occurs when private enterprise enhances land values. Pri-
vate enterprise follows the market, which itself follows 
money. Can one deduce from this that privately created 
betterment generally accrues to the well-off, therefore 
falling unequally? Or might we begin on a more micro-
economic level, focusing on the behavior of individuals 
as home-dwellers, and reason that over a lifetime one is 
probably going to benefit as much as one benefits others? 
Would the latter assumption result in spreading or would 
that depend on the relative level of entrepreneurial activ-
ity of the various classes in the market? Or can we simply 
say that since most property belongs to the affluent (even 
that partially held, e.g. leased, by the less affluent), pri-
vately created betterment will fall unevenly? 
In the absence of empirical information, all this is rather 
speculative. However, one obviously relevant difference 
between privately created betterment and publicly created 
betterment is that the transactions which create the latter 
are relatively isolated in time and place, i.e. there are far 
fewer government interventions in the land market than 
there are private dealings. This would suggest that even 
considered as a random process, public betterment is less 
likely to be evenly spread. 
These considerations - the incentive problem, and the 
possibly differing patterns of incidence of publicly and 
privately created betterment - together with the matter 
of political feasibility, stand in the way of the universal 
tax approach to betterment recovery. 
On the other hand, there exist two factors which might 
be said to constitute the special benefits of a universal 
betterment tax mechanism. Universal recovery obviates 
the need to distinguish in some fashion between publicly 
and privately created betterment. This will considerably 
lower the administrative costs involved in recapture. And, 
given a particular tax rate, universal recovery recovers 
more betterment, that is more money for public use, than 
would recovery only of publicly created betterment. 
B Public Recovery of Publicly Created Betterment by 
Means of a Tax 
If we should decide to recapture only publicly created 
betterment, we could do so by applying a new tax to profit 
realized from transactions in publicly bettered land. The 
British have had considerable practical experience with 
just this type of device, which they have termed a better-
ment levy. The levy has undergone many changes since its 
institution in 1947; examination of its history will be 
instructive. 
The 1947 Act 
Shortly after World War Two, the British embarked on a 
comprehensive scheme of land use control a.:1d planning. 
As a part of that scheme, Parliament established a system 
of compensation dispensation and betterment recovery.105 
The Act of 1947 was the creation of a Labour Government. 
The Act nationalized future development rights in land. 
That is, the current owner thereafter owned the land only 
in its current use; rights in the land with respect to future 
uses belonged to the State. A once-for-all compensation 
package of 300 million pounds sterling was paid to land 
owners for this "taking" of future rights. The Act also im-
posed a 100 per cent betterment tax which was payable 
to the State when the current use was changed, pursuant 
to planning permission (somewhat analogous to a zone 
change) to a more valuable use. 
Thus the 1947 Act theoretically created a mechanism 
which would fully recapture betterment created by the 
public granting of planning permission. However, unfore-
seen problems undermined this expectation. 
The l 00 per cent recovery created a large incentive prob-
lem. By removing the owner's right to anything more than 
the existing use value of his land, the Act left the owner 
with no incentive (except to realize its present value) to 
part with his land. The result was that a large amount of 
land was taken off the market. 106 Also, under the 194 7 
Act, betterment was recovered by the government at the 
time it granted planning permission to the private party. 
This caused two difficulties. First, the increase in land 
value was an expected change, not an actual change. Be-
cause of this, the amount of the tax was criticized as 
arbitrary. '°7 Second, although land value increments are 
created by other public action beside planning permis-
sion, the 194 7 Act made no provision for recovery in 
these situations. 
The 1952 and 1959 Acts 
The distinctive and apparently arbitrary nature of the 
betterment tax was sufficiently unpopular to make it a 
campaign issue in the national Parliamentary elections of 
195 l. Shortly after gaining a parliamentary majority that 
year, the new Conservative Government abolished the 
betterment tax. The result was the continuation of worse-
ment compensation without the recovery of betterment. 
Inequities and distortions of the kind noted above are 
thought to have marked this period of British land use 
planning ( 1952-1959).108 
Those inequities culminated, in the public eye at least, in 
the suicide of Mr. Pilgrim. Mr. Pilgrim owned land for 
which he had in the recent past been able to secure plan-
ning permission. Then the government informed him that 
his land was now needed for governmental purposes and 
that it would be acquired by compulsory purchase (the 
English equivalent to condemnation). On the open mar-
ket, Mr. Pilgrim's land was worth its existing use value 
plus its development value with respect to the use for 
which permission was granted. In a compulsory purchase 
proceeding, however, it was worth only its existing use 
value. In Mr. Pilgrim's case, those two figures were very 
far apart, and Mr. Pilgrim, who was far from a large land-
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holder, had relied on the open market value. Finding 
himself unable to get anything near what he had expected 
to realize from his land and in a very tight situation, Mr. 
Pilgrim decided to avoid further exposure to the slings 
and arrows of outrageous fortune. His suicide created a 
public outcry against the 1952 legislation. 
The Conservative Government responded by passing the 
Town and Country Planning Act of 1959. It changed the 
compulsory purchase formula to equal existing use value 
plus a hypothetical development value. The result seems 
to have been the lessening of land use planning, in order 
to lessen the compensation bill. 
The Land Commission 
When the Labour Party returned to power in 1964, their 
program included the reinstatement of a betterment tax, 
to be administered by a Land Commission. This became 
law shortly thereafter. The Land Commission was given 
two jobs, to acquire land (compulsorily and not) and to 
administer the betterment tax. Worsement compensation 
and betterment recovery were linked. 
The betterment tax administered by the Land Commis-
sion was the most sophisticated to date. It was charged 
only to land which had been granted planning permission 
and only then when development value was realized. 
Realization was defined by six categories, the most im-
portant of which were sale, rental, and the commence-
ment of material development. The rate of the tax was 
not specified in the Act, but it started at 40 per cent and 
was later moved to 50 and 55 per cent. Appreciation due 
to factors other than the granting of planning permission 
was not to be taken into account in determining the tax. 
Betterment was calculated by the following formula: 
Betterment Tax= 40% Net Development Value (NDV) 
NDV =Market Value Base Value - Expenditures on 
Improvements and Ancillary Rights 
Base Value = the purchase price at the last sale, 
or 
Base Value+ !~current use value+ severance depreciation, 
(whichever is higher) 
Payment of the betterment tax exempted the land from 
capital gains taxation. The other half of the Land Com-
mission's work was land banking. Those acquisitions 
madt! compulsorily were to be purchased at a price equal 
to the market value minus the betterment tax collectable. 
Although, or perhaps because, this betterment tax was 
quite sophisticated, problems did arise. Land was again 
withheld from the market to a notable degree. Observers 
are unsure whether this was a result of the tax level, public 
misunderstanding of the complex administrative formula, 
or the expectation of those owners - and many observers 
focus on this point - that the Tories, when they returned 
to power, would abolish the tax. 
On the whole, however, one might hazard the conclusion 
that the Land Commission mechanism did put British 
land use planning on a structurally sound basis: the Labour 
years of 1964 to 1969 were the heyday of British plan-
ning. This experience confirms to some extent several of 
the arguments made for betterment recovery, although 
the precise relationships await discovery by detailed 
research. 
A second tentative conclusion which can be drawn from 
the British experience with the betterment tax concerns 
the political viability of a tax approach to betterment re-
covery. The Conservative Party has consistently opposed 
the betterment tax, and that opposition has compromised 
the tax's effectiveness. It is unclear whether this opposi-
tion is a result of the relative merits of the tax as a device 
for betterment recovery or whether it focuses on the ques-
tion of recapture itself. The contrast between the polit-
ical distress of the betterment levy and the political suc-
cess of a second, non-tax betterment recovery device used 
in Britain, would appear to suggest that the opposition is 
not to the recovery itself. 109 Instead, perhaps these dif-
ferences in acceptability can be explained in terms of the 
varying administrative costs of the two devices: Any re-
covery mechanism which, like a tax, requires a definition 
of betterment, will be costly. 
However, it is more likely that this differential accept-
ability can be traced to the inherent limitations on the 
applicability of the recoupment mechanism. 110 
C Public Recovery of Publicly 0-eated Betterment by 
More Disaggregated Means 
We have identified two large impediments to the estab-
lishment of betterment recovery - the possibility of sig-
nificant administrative costs and political opposition. The 
first is more of a problem with respect to taxation of only 
publicly created betterment; the second would appear to 
be more forceful with respect to the universal tax. It may 
be that these obstacles can be diminished by adopting a 
much less unitary approach to betterment recovery. That 
is, if we focus on the governmental actions which actually 
"create" betterment, perhaps then we can restructure 
those actions, in minor but important ways. In this way, 
we might fashion betterment recovery mechanisms which 
do not raise administrative costs above their present levels, 
and we may also be able actually to create political incen-
tives for the "establishment" of betterment recovery. 209 
In keeping with this disaggregated approach, I shall focus 
separately on the two types of governmental action which 
"create" betterment, the active intervention of public im-
provement and the use of the zoning power. 
Public Improvements 
Examples of public improvements which increase land 
values are legion. Some of the most obvious are road and 
mass transit construction and urban renewal. I will sug-
gest three mechanisms or models by which the public can 
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recapture the betterment which results from this type of 
intervention: recoupment, use density, and reformed spe-
cial assessment. 
a The Recoupment Model 
Recoupment refers to the practice of public land acquisi-
tion, public development of that land, and the retention 
by the public of the profits which accrue when the land 
is sold or leased by the public. It is a mechanism to achieve 
public control at critical points where land development 
will occur and where large amounts of betterment will re-
sult. Recoupment practices have been alive and well in 
Britain for several decades, enjoying bipartisan political 
support. 
The outstanding illustration of the process is New Town 
development. In Britain, New Towns are decided upon by 
the national government, in consultation with local gov-
ernments. The actual development is entrusted to public 
development corporations, one for each Town. The cor-
poration has the authority to acquire land compulsorily 
within the area designated by Parliament as the New Town, 
and it undertakes most of the development (including 
roads, housing, factory shells, shops, and other facilities). 
Compulsory purchase is made at the market value of the 
land assuming that there were no New Town being de-
veloped, necessarily a somewhat speculative price. Since 
the majority of New Towns are developed almost from 
scratch, this amounts to agricultural value, generally very 
low. 
On this land, the corporation makes public improvements 
designed to make the land attractive to residents and busi-
ness. When investment occurs (the New Towns have been 
very successful in this respect), the land value of the Town 
increases substantially. This value increment is recaptured 
by the public corporation through industrial and com-
mercial leases. The money taken in this fashion is gener-
ally sufficient to pay for the improvements made by the 
corporation, to cover administrative costs, to subsidize 
low-cost housing for working-class residents, and to leave 
a tidy surplus. 
The scheme has proved so successful as to create a debate 
as to how this public surplus should be used. Should it go 
toward more public improvements in the New Town, be 
distributed among the New Town residents, or be recap-
tured by the national government? Professor Self has sug-
gested splitting the money between the national taxpayer 
(to encourage the building of New Towns) and the New 
Town resident (to finance local services).111 
New Town development certainly is a dramatic illustra-
tion of the recoupment idea. How widely this mechanism 
is used on a more local level or what the Land Commis-
sion has done with it I do not know. Certainly the prin-
ciple is not limited to a New Town context. 
Recoupment has been referred to in the bulk of the 
American literature as "excess condemnation." Writing 
in 1917; Mr. Robert Cushman stated that " ... in no 
American city has there been any experience of any real 
importance with the policy of excess condemnation as a 
means of financing public improvements." 112 Writers 
since Cushman have commented on the constitutional 
obstacle to such a scheme.113 They have not documented 
instances in which recoupment has been used in this 
country. 
Cities in other nations have made considerable use of this 
model. Cushman's examination of the application of the 
model in Europe and Canada in the years before 1917 
leads him to the conclusion that the risks of such public 
enterprise are large. He numbered among these risks the 
difficulty of predicting an increment and the amount of 
that increment, the uncertainty of finding a buyer, the 
certainty of heavy initial outlay of public funds for con-
demnation costs, the certainty of a loss of tax revenue, 
the possibility of a general depression in land values, and 
the possibility of inefficient administration by local 
officials. 
These considerations suggest that "excess condemnation" 
is an appropriate betterment recovery mechanism in only 
a limited number of situations. It should be considered 
only when a public improvement is relatively certain to 
increase land values, when that value increment is confined 
to rather small area of land (so as to limit the condemna-
tion required), and when the real estate market is realtively 
strong. It would be advisable to use this technique in situ-
ations in which the number of persons to be compensated 
is small and the value of the land to be taken is low 
(e.g. presently undeveloped land). This will keep the con-
demnation and administration costs down, ensure a mini-
mal tax loss, and disturb a mi!limum of property owners 
(condemnation and lease-back may further reduce the 
burden on owners). These limitations on the scope of ex-
cess condemnation practice are entirely in accord with 
the limitation on the practice imposed by the practical 
fact that each use of it will require a substantial amount 
of scarce public funds. 
The excess condemnation mechanism would seem to be 
appropriate for large-scale transportation development, 
highways and mass transit in particular. In the planning 
stages of such developments, one could pinpoint areas, 
such as access points and interchanges, at which substan-
tial betterment would no doubt accrue. Many of these 
areas will be undeveloped at that point in time, others 
will be underdeveloped. Inner-city urban renewal, in con-
trast, may well represent a situation in which excess con-
demnation is not a good idea. It should be remembered 
that one of the justifications for betterment recovery is 
to make worsement compensation adequate. The more 
condemnation that is required to accomplish this, the 
more circular the argument becomes. Of course, New 
Town development on presently undeveloped land repre-
sents the situation most appropriate for excess con-
demnation. 
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b The Use Density Model 
When the government builds a highway, it creates access. 
Access is a very valuable commodity; indeed, access is 
the raison d'etre of the city. 
We are unaccustomed to viewing a highway toll as a re-
flection of an increase in the value of the land taken for 
the road; it is more commonly associated with the con-
crete poured over that land. We are similarly unaccustomed 
to thinking of that highway as valuable space which might 
be devoted to profitable use besides its use as a transpor-
tation corridor. These new perceptions of land taken for 
public improvements constitute the basis for the use den-
sity model. 
To illustrate, land taken for highway purposes is currently 
used in almost every instance for that one purpose only. 
However, it is possible to use that land and the air rights 
over it for other uses. Residential and office Tace can be 
accommodated above transportation space.11 This addi-
tional use could be constructed and owned or leased by 
the public, who would thus enjoy the increase in value 
created by the access which the highway provides. Or the 
public might auction off the rights to contract and own 
the supplemental use. 
The use density model does not have many of the theo-
retical or practical limitations which confine the useful-
ness of excess condemnation. Rather, the most signifi-
cant limits on its application are those on the govern-
mental imagination. 
c The Special Assessment Model 
The outline of special assessment law as it exists today 
has been sketched and its limitations and legal difficulties 
examined. Clearly, special assessment law must be re-
formed if it is to serve as a fair and efficient mechanism 
for betterment recovery. We would need, for example, 
to remove the (in places, statutory) limitation which al-
lows only land abutting the improvement to be assessed. 
We would need to assess at the time of realization, not 
at the time of the construction or completion of the im-
provement. Very importantly, we would have to amend 
the doctrine which confines assessments to so-called local 
improvements while retaining the notion that special 
benefit still is the basis for assessment. We would need to 
remove the possibility of assessment by purely private 
ini tfa tive. 
One might also suggest that we begin to assess owners on 
the basis of ben~fit received and not cost of improvement. 
I believe, however, that this is one limit that should be 
retained. Any change in the assessment measure which is 
made in the name of more precise recovery. of betterment 
must encounter the difficult task of measuring that better-
ment. I have shown the complexities which the British 
attempt involved. Moreover, because of the incentive 
problem, recovery cannot be in full; therefore any pre-
cise measurement of betterment will have to be multiplied 
by some rather arbitrary percentage ( 40 to 55 in Britain). 
If we retain a cost calculus, what we lose in betterment 
recovery in this way we might very well make up in lower 
administrative costs which the concrete improvement 
cost figure enables us to achieve. For these reasons, and 
because of the desire to minimize the number of changes 
- especially those which would have to be sought in the 
legislature - in current practice, I suggest the retention 
of the cost formula. 
The enhanced scope of special assessment application 
may, however, change somewhat the composition of that 
cost. Present law allows "expense incidental to the im-
provement," including compensation made by the public 
authority for land taken for the improvements, to be in-
cluded in the assessment. 115 Since, under the present prac-
tice, the types of improvement for which assessment is 
permitted are very small-scale, condemnation costs are 
quite low. When and if assessments can be used in con-
nection with urban renewal and other major physical 
interventions, those costs will be substantial. 
The key to current assessment practice is the drawing of 
the assessment district and the application of the cost 
formula. Reforming assessment would mean changing 
these processes. First, because assessment would occur 
upon realization (the British system is an illustration), we 
would have a better indication whether or not there really 
was a benefit conferred. I suggest that if realization indi-
cates that no benefit has been received (for instance, if 
the sale price three years after the improvement is lower 
than was the previous sales price two years before the im-
provement; or if the current price is higher, but only by 
the amount of inflation over that period), then no assess-
ment should be made. This would make the drawing of 
the district lines less crucial than under the present prac-
tice, which makes assessment follow automatically from 
inclusion within the assessment district. However, be-
cause we are expanding the application of assessment be-
yond abutting owners it becomes increasingly important 
that the assessment formula allocate the cost according 
to the spread of benefits. One approach might be to 
draw concentric circles around a renewal project and 
have the owners in the inner circles pay a greater ftropor-
tion of the cost than owners in the outer circles.1 6 
2 Zone Changes 
The other public intervention in the land market which 
creates substantial betterment is zone decisions. Two re-
covery mechanisms are appropriate for this situation: con-
ditional zoning and zone auctions. 
a The Conditional Zoning Model 
"Conditional zoning" is a term of art used to describe a 
zoning ordinance which permits a use of property in a 
zoning district subject to restrictions other than those 
applicable to all land similarly classified. The mechanism 
is used today to bring some amount of flexibility to the 
otherwise rigid zoning process. This need is felt to be par-
ticularly important in the case of a boundary line between 
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two different use districts. Any change in zone for prop-
erty on that boundary line will effectively redraw the line 
and possibly cause damage to the property in the more 
restricted use district which forms the new boundary line. 
Conditional zoning is a way of showing concern for the 
impact on that boundary property. Typical conditions 
imposed include restricting buildings to a small area of 
the rezoned land and requiring fencing and landscaping of 
a particular kind on that land. 
Put simply, the proposal advanced here is to use the zone 
change, which itself is the event which "produces" better-
ment, as the vehicle for recovering that benefit in kind 
through the imposition of conditions which would benefit 
the public. 
Let me illustrate. B owns land now zoned agricultural. He 
applies for a zone change so that he may build a large 
housing development. A change in zone will clearly in-
crease the value of B's land, although by how much is not 
known. The municipality might grant the zone change 
subject to the condition that the housing built on the 
land be at least 20 per cent subsidized housing. Or it might 
demand that B dedicate a portion of his land for school 
or park sites. 
As in the cases of the recoupment and reformed special 
assessment mechanisms, there is no need in this scheme 
to calculate the exact amount of betterment created. 
What would be required is the assurance that the recovery 
did not exceed the benefit conferred. Indeed, in order 
to cope with theincentive problem, we would probably 
want to make sure that recovery was less than the bene-
fit. There would, of course, be administrative costs in-
volved in this determination although their extent is diffi-
cult to determine. 
One advantage to such recovery in kind is the flexibility 
allowed the public in its choice of 'payment.' Besides re-
quiring of residential builders that parks {perhaps of the 
vest-pocket variety) and school sites be set aside, the 
municipality might require an industrial user to meet stiff 
pollution standards, or· it might feel that a park was 
equally, perhaps more, appropriate in industrial space. 
Any potential user could be required to meet higher and 
more expensive architectural standards. As with the use 
density concept, one's imagination would appear to set 
the limits. 
On the other hand, there would be no cash payment to 
the municipality with which the public would offset 
worsement compensation. Nonetheless, to the extent that 
the dedication of land by condition offsets the need for 
condemnation elsewhere, there would as in the case of 
monetary recovery, be an offset effect. 
There are two current municipal practices related to the 
conditional zoning model. The first is subdivision exac-
tion. In this scheme, subdivision approval is conditioned 
upon the owner, assuming such burdens as street lay-out 
and construction. Some recent case law has moved be-
yond such a limited exaction to legitimize demands like 
land dedication for schools and parks.117 But a subdivi-
sion exaction is based on a cost, not a benefit rationale; 
it is a device attempting to impose on owners those costs 
which their development "create" for the community. Al-
though the result may happen to be the same in some 
cases, in most cases very different results would flow· 
from the use of cost and betterment mechanisms. For 
example, the imposition of costs would no doubt be 
passed on to the consumer, whereas the recovery of wind-
fall profit ought not substantially to affect the cost to the 
consumer.118 This difference may be sufficient to deter-
mine who occupies the housing.119 
A second variation of the conditional zoning proposal, 
known as "incentive zoning," is now coming into use, in, 
for example, San Francisco, New York and Chicago. 120 
Typically, this practice involves the granting of a higher 
floor-to-area ratio than that normally allowed in the zon-
ing district to an owner in return for some consideration. 
In New York, this practice has been used in the Theatre 
District and the consideration exacted is the establish-
ment of a theatre in the building.121 In San Francisco, 
ratio increases are awarded for parking space accommo-
dation, sidewalk widening, provision of public plaza, and 
provision of a public observation deck on the top of the 
building, among others.122 In Chicago, a somewhat simi-
lar mechanism has been used to preserve landmark struc-
tures.123 These uses of incentive zoning are limited forms 
of betterment recovery. They only place conditions on a 
change in the floor-to-area ratio, not on a change in the 
underlying zone. Yet these devices do point the way 
toward larger-scale efforts, as embodied in the suggested 
model. 
b The Auction Model 
Mr. Marion Clawson has suggested selling zone changes.124 
He envisions the process as an: 
open, competitive sale of zoning and rezoning of 
some tract of (say) 20 to 100 acres within a mile 
square or some other similar area. Conditions to 
be met by the buyer should be specified and 
made part of the contract (and later enforced). 
Owners of land or options on land would bid 
cash sums for the rezoning classification. While 
the zoning authority should retain the right to 
reject any and all bids, normally the reclassifica-
tion would be awarded to the highest bidder.125 
The auction model is widely used by the federal govern-
ment with regard to timber and mineral leases. Clawson 
states that it is responsible for receipts of over $1.25 
billion in the past fifteen years in mineral leases for sub-
merged lands off the seacoast.126 
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Clawson's suggestions is not unprecedented. Professor Self 
characterizes the 194 7 British betterment tax in similar 
terms: 
This charge was meant to be not a tax but a sale 
by the State of the value of planning permission, 
and the original idea was that it should be as-
sessed according to 'commercial considerations 
tempered by the public interest. '127 
In Clawson's scheme the government acts as little more 
than auctioneer. 
The utility of this solution hinges on how much faith one 
has in the land use planning process, as compared with a 
free market, to make the most desirable land use decision. 
Clawson opines: 
In many situations, the decision to zone or re-
zone certain tracts within a gem;ral area, and to 
deny such classification to other tracts, is neces-
sarily arbitrary to a considerable degree. Plan-
ning processes are simply not precise enough to 
prove unequivocally that one tract is suitable for 
development but that its neighbors are not. 128 
In other words, the auction device should be limited to 
those situations in which the planning process is unable 
to choose between two or more sites. 
One defect from which the zoning auction model suffers 
to some extent is that it makes ability-to-pay the allocat-
ing mechanism. This is mitigated by the fact that the bid-
ders may not desire to pay more for the zone change than 
the betterment it will confer. If this limit on bidding is 
voluntarily preserved, then ability to pay is not decisive. 
However, if bidders differ in their ability to make a zone 
change "pay off," in terms of future development, then it 
cannot be denied that the zoning auction will favor those 
most able to do so. But, what is a defect in the light of 
one set of objectives may be a virtue from another per-
spective. The higher the bid, the more revenue is raised. 
Five mechanisms for the recovery of publicly created bet-
terment have been advanced: recoupment; use density; 
reformed special assessment; conditional zoning; zoning 
auction. Together, they comprise the disaggregated ap-
proach to the recapture of publicly created betterment. 
IV Legal Barriers to the Use of the Various Approaches to 
Betterment Recovery 
A tax approach to betterment recovery, universal or par-
tial, does not raise many interesting legal problems. It 
would, however, require new legislation. In this sense, 
adoption of a tax scheme for betterment recovery faces 
a large barrier. In contrast, the five mechanisms which 
comprise the disaggregated approach to the recovery of 
publicly created betterment are based on current public 
processes, although requiring some changes in those 
processes. This raises two questions: are those changes 
constitutional, and is new legislation needed to imple-
ment them? 
A Excess Condemnation / Recoupment 
Although there has been almost no experience in this 
country with excess condemnation as I have described it, 
there is a body of law which relates to this practice, curi-
ously enough known as the "excess condemnation" doc-
trine. The term of art covers three distinct practices, 
which are generally referred to as the taking of remnants, 
the protection of public improvements, and recoupment. 
The last is synonymous with what I have been calling ex-
cess condemnation. Courts have generally upheld the first 
practice, waffled on the second, and inveighed rhetor-
ically against the third. Objections to any of the three 
have been based on the requirement that condemnation 
be used only for a "public purpose." 
Public improvement, such as street construction, may 
leave in its wake untouched, odd-shaped fragments of 
land called remnants, of such size and character as to be 
unusable. Courts have ruled that the taking of such prop-
erty fulfills a valid public purpose, even though that land 
is not physically needed to accommodate the public im-
provement and is therefore "excess." The courts have 
reasoned that the taking is small in terms of harm to the 
owner, and the value of the taking to society (including 
esthetic considerations and protection of the public im-
provement) is large. 129 
Part of the rationale for taking remnants has been the 
protection of public improvements (or to be more precise, 
the prevention of uses inconsistent with the improvement). 
The distinction between the remnant case and the pro-
tection case appears to be the size of the taking. This 
factor of added acreage has caused many of the jurisdic-
tions who have ruled on the matter to hold that con-
demnation for this purpose is not valid. 130 The reasoning 
follows the balancing model used in the remnant cases. 
Recoupment involves the taking of property of one per-
son and the sale or leasing of it, after a period of time 
and after development, to another person. It contem-
plates a transaction made for profit, and corresponds to 
the proposed excess condemnation mechanism. Several 
state court decisions have held or suggested that such 
recoupment is not a public purpose. 131 Typical is Rich-
mond v. Carnea/: 132 
Lot owners ... have the right to insist that their 
property adjacent to the street shall not be taken 
from them and sold at a profit, either to pay or 
to reduce the expense of opening the street. 
Such a transaction may be good financing on the 
part of the city, and greatly to its benefit, but 
such use of private property is not a public use. 
Public use and public benefit are not synony-
mous terms. 133 
However, the restrictive "recoupment" case law existing 
on the state court level is limited to four or five cases, 
arguably much in need of revision. Contrary to the sug-
gestion in Richmond (decided in 192 l ), the fact is that 
the great majority of jurisdictions now hold that public 
benefit and public use are synonymous terms. 134 
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The excess condemnation model that I have outlined is 
somewhat analogous to urban renewal practice. In both, 
government takes one person's property and sells it to 
another. Urban renewal has been "almost universally"135 
held to be within the confines of the public purpose rule. 
The reasoning has generally been that " ... the achieve-
ment of redevelopment of slum and blighted areas ... 
constitutes ... a public use and a public purpose, regard-
less of the use which may be made of the property after 
the redevelopment has been achieved." 136 The transfer 
of property from one individual to another is seen as 
merely incidental to the accomplishment of the primary 
purpose of the condemnation. The urban renewal case 
law marks the culmination of the doctrinal shift from a 
narrow interpretation of "~ublic purpose" to one synony-
mous with public benefit.1 7 
Thus, a modern argument for the validity of the excess 
condemnation mechanism would only have to justify the 
practice by the less stringent "public benefit" standard. 
Such an argument would embrace all of the policy con-
siderations which argued for the recovery of publicly 
created betterment and which were discussed in the first 
section of this analysis. Balanced against these public 
benefits would be the private costs at issue. In this re-
spect, it is again important to note that budgetary and 
policy considerations will help to confine excess con-
demnation to a limited sphere within which disturbance 
of private property rights will be minimized. By this test, 
excess condemnation would have to be upheld. 
In summary, then, the excess condemnation mechanism 
can be justified under the modern sweep of the public 
purpose rule. Moreover, because the power of eminent 
domain is inherent in municipal authority new legislation 
would not be required. 
B Use Density 
I know of no cases involving the use density mechanism 
suggested. The device would appear to be open to legal 
challenge on one ground only, that of the public purpose 
limitation on a municipality's taxing power. Whether 
ground~d in constitutional law or common law, it is fixed 
doctrine that " ... taxation is a mode a raising revenue 
for public purposes only."138 This has generally been in-
terpreted as meaning that a use " ... should be for the 
use and benefit of every person in the municipal cor-
poration."139 
Some early cases held that municipalities were prevented 
from operating businesses (such as movie theaters and 
coal delivery) by this doctrine.140 In recent years, however, 
this doctrine has been considerably relaxed, 141 and it is 
quite unlikely that a use density practice could be suc-
cessfully attacked in this manner. Since governmental 
operation of an enterprise can produce efficiencies and 
redistributional effects which private enterprise may not 
achieve, the demise of this doctrine is a welcome oc-
currence. 
The question of whether new legislation would be nec-
essary to legitimize this practice is more difficult to 
answer. If it is a municipality which is asserting its auth-
ority to undertake use density activity, one could argue 
that such authority is inherent in the municipal corpora-
tion or that it can be implied from other authority which 
has been expressly granted to the municipality (e.g. power 
to maintain the highway system) or that it derives from 
the powers of home-rule municipalities.142 Each of these 
doctrines is imprecise, and they vary greatly from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. 
C Special Assessment 
Some of the reforms in special assessment law argued for 
would require legislative action (e.g., repeal of statutes 
limiting assessment to abutting land). These reforms do 
not appear to raise consitutional problems. And since 
the remaining aspects of the mechanism borrow from 
current, legal practice, the reformed special assessment 
mechanism would not appear to be subject to challenge 
in the courts. 
Moreover, the reforms suggested remove the knotty con-
stitutional difficulties which can be raised about current 
special assessment law. Since assessment is delayed until 
realization, the assessor can determine, within limits, 
whether a benefit has occurred and if it has not, no as-
sessment is made. Since the reform blocks purely private 
initiative, no delegation problem remains. Because noth-
ing is taken until benefit is established, the equal protec-
tion problem vanishes. And since the improvements to 
which the mechanism should apply are indeed substantial, 
there is no question that they constitute a public and not 
a private purpose. 
D Conditional Zoning 
As noted, conditional zoning is practiced today, though 
not as a mechanism for the recovery of betterment. The 
legal doctrine which has grown up to define its limits has 
two parts, "conditional zoning" doctrine and "contract 
zoning" doctrine, both of which at first seem to present 
obstacles to a widespread use of these zoning practices. 
Conditional zoning occurs, in legal parlance, when a 
zoning amendment " ... permits a use of a particular 
property in a zoning district subject to restrictions other 
than those applicable to all land similarly classified." 143 
Contract zoning occurs when a zoning amendment 
" ... authorizes a particular use only if the landowner 
enters into a covenant to restrict the use in certain 
ways." 144 The essential distinctions between the two 
seem to be the elements of negotiation between owner 
and zoning authority and the establishment of a running 
covenant which embodies the conditions agreed to, which 
elements are presently only in contract zoning: 
Both conditional and contract zoning have been chal-
lenged on the following grounds. 
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- It is contended that conditions are extracted in a 
bargaining process between the legislature and the land-
owner before a change in zone is granted and that this 
process must result in the compromise of proper plan-
ning standards, because of the quid pro quo which the 
planning authority presumably makes in recognition of 
the owner's concessions. Such a compromise borders on 
spot zoning, in which the public good is compromised 
for private gain and which is illegal. Courts often reveal 
this concern by stating it in a broader way. This type of 
zoning, they assert, results in a "piecemeal" rather than 
a "uniform" approach to planning, in violation of the 
enabling legislation. 
- It is contended that conditional zoning and contract 
zoning may represent a procedure whereby the legisla-
ture is able to do indirectly what it could not do if done 
directly. The imposition of unconstitutional conditions 
is an example. 
Other challenges are directed only against contract 
zoning. 
- It is contended that contract zoning represents a bar-
gaining away of the police power. If the municipality 
honors the covenant, as it is bound to do, it is barred 
from later exercising its zoning power in a way that will 
alter that covenant. A municipality should not be able to 
surrender its right, indeed, its duty, to be able to respond 
to changed conditions. 
- It is contended that another effect of contract zoning 
is that the zoning authority, in effect, bypasses the hear-
ing stage of the zoning process. 
- It is contended that the various policies which lead 
courts to look with disfavor on running covenants apply 
equally well to contract zoning. 145 
Challenges to conditional zoning have had little success.146 
Those directed at contract zoning have been better re-
ceived; Anderson states that while the question has been 
decided by only a handul of state courts, those which 
have decided are split on the answer.147 Typical of the 
decisions which find contract zoning invalid is Hartnett 
v.Austin: 
In exercising its zoning powers the muncipality 
must deal with well-defined classes of uses. If 
each parcel of property were zoned on the basis 
of variables that could enter into private con-
tracts then the whole scheme and objective of 
community planning and zoning would collapse 
... This is so because all genuine standards 
would have been eliminated from the zoning 
ordinance ... Both the benefits of and the rea-
sons for a well-ordered comprehensive zoning 
scheme would be eliminated.149 
But conditional and contract zoning have been used for 
very different reasons than are being suggested here. The 
betterment recovery rationale and process puts the prac-
tice in an entirely new light. There are two ways to ap-
proach the case law from this new perspective. 
First, one might argue that the suggested mechanism does 
not in fact constitute either conditional or contract zon-
ing as presently defined in the case law. This theory would 
be based on an amendment to the zoning ordinance or 
to the enabling legislation providing that in every case 
where a change in zone creates substantial betterment 
the zoning authority may impose such conditions as will 
result in the recapture of that betterment. Given such an 
. ordinance or statute, one could argue that the conditions 
imposed are no longer conditions required outside of the 
terms of the ordinance, causing a compromise of its terms. 
The zoning authority would not be asking the owner upon 
whom conditions are imposed to do anything that other 
owners in his same position are not asked to do. 
If this conceptual skirting of existing conditional zoning 
doctrine proved inadequate, then one could second 
argue the merits of contract zoning doctrine as it applies 
to the suggested mechanism. Given the radically different 
function of that mechanism, the case law, undeveloped 
as it is, must be rethought as applied to this new practice. 
Returning, then, to the arguments outlined above, I will 
examine how they apply to the model: 
- The problem noted by the Hartnett court was that con-
tract zoning would eliminate genuine planning standards 
from zoning practice, changing the basis for that rezoning 
from considerations of the general welfare to conditions 
bargained for and received. While this may be true of the 
traditional notion of conditional and contract zoning, 
general welfare criteria are not traded-off in the new model. 
The imposition of conditions is not dependent upon the 
granting of the change of zone, per se, but upon the cre-
ation of substantial betterment. Moreover, the conditions 
themselves are related to the general welfare, since they 
are imposed in order to recover betterment, the policy 
for which is consistent with planning standards. The only 
bargaining would concern the extent to which the owner 
will take on duties which promote the general welfare. 
- The new model may be open to the abuse of zoning 
authorities attempting to impose unconstitutional condi-
tions. For this reason, the device must embody procedural 
safeguards, such as open hearings, as well as substantive 
limits. These safeguards should not be difficult to build 
in; zoning hearings and judicial review are procedures 
which already exist and could easily be incorporated into 
the proposed model. 215 
However, these traditional limits may be insufficient. 
Should a public authority be able to tell an owner that 
he must put aside one-eighth of his land, on which he de-
sires to build a home for himself, for a public use? Per-
haps a homestead exemption should be built into the 
mechanism. Or perhaps the public authority should be 
required to give the owner the option of compliance with 
a number of alternative conditions, as well as (if these 
did not suit him) the choice of payment of an arbitrary 
increment tax, or, upon disposition of the property, a 
special local capital gains tax. 
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- The municipality can retain its power to change its 
mind by refraining from promising anything in bilateral 
contract form, instead writing the conditions into the 
zoning amendment, much in the manner of a unilateral 
contract. 
- Given the proper procedural safeguards, the hearing 
stage will not be bypassed. 
- Again, by proper use of the zoning regulations, the 
municipality need not rely on running covenants. There-
fore the policies concerning the utility of those devices 
are not germane. 
In summary, the suggested mechanism may well be able 
to avoid being constr~onditional or contract zon-
ing, or if caught within the confines of that doctrine, it 
nonetheless can be argued to possess none of the five 
characteristics which have made some courts suspicious 
of the traditional practice. 
Last, the suggested conditional zoning mechanism may 
be subject to the constitutional challenge that it consti-
tutes a taking of property without compensation, the 
property at issue being the betterment itself. This is a 
flimsy position. The State is both giving as well as taking 
here. While the change in zone creates the betterment, 
the conditions imposed in that same transaction substan-
tially recapture it. Of course, it might be argued that the 
betterment is a joint creation. Several responses are possible. 
First, to the extent that the conditions imposed do not 
wholly recapture the betterment (and we desire this re-
sult because of the incentive problem), the betterment 
continues to be shared between the owner and the munic-
ipality. Since the betterment is, from the owner's perspec-
tive, at most created jointly, each creator receives a share, 
and there is no taking. 
Second, one could contest the premise of the point cre-
ation argument, and argue that only the action of the 
zoning authority creates the value, thus denying that 
there is any private property at stake here. (Or, if there 
are private property rights, they have not vested in the 
owner.) 
Third, the analogy to subdivision exactions is available. 
There the municipality imposes conditions on the owner 
as a cost of subdivision approval. The practice is acknowl-
edged to involve property rights, but the exaction is said 
to be justified under the police power. Of course, to the 
extent that the conditional zoning mechanism imposes 
conditions the cost of which go beyond the costs justi-
fied under subdivision exaction law, we cannot rely on 
that law to buttress our case. 
In summary, the conditional zoning device seems to be 
secure against a Fifth Amendment challenge. 
It is possible, however, that new enabling legislation will 
be necessary to authorize this practice. The conditional 
and contract zoning literature contains an .argument to the 
effect that neither of those practices is authorized by 
current zoning enabling legislati0n, which is uniformly 
silent on the question. One commentator has devoted 
considerable energy to the argument that since there r.; 
no express authorization the practices are illegal.150 Other 
writers come to the opposite conclusion.151 The courts 
have not addressed this question, but the approval of con-
tract and conditional zoning by several jurisdictions could 
indicate a sub silentio resolution of this point. Moreover, 
several jurisdictions .have upheld the practice of subdivi-
sion exaction in the absence of state statutory authoriza-
tion other than the traditional zoning enabling act. 152 The 
differences between the model advanced and current prac-
tice would appear to have no bearing on this argument. 
E Selling Zone Changes 
Zone changes, if sold at all today, are sold under-the-
table. There is no precedent concerning the legality of 
over-the-counter sales. However, one legal challenge can 
be foreseen: since the power to zone is a police power, its 
use must be justified by a police power purpose. In fact, 
the practice of fiscal zoning, theoretically somewhat anal-
ogous to selling zone changes (in that it is used to raise 
revenue), has been subject to the challenge that it is out-
side the police power. 
Fiscal zoning is a name for the behavior of those zoning 
authorities which base their decisions on the financial con-
sequences to the municipality: "zoning out" by one means 
or another what they perceive as expensive uses, such as 
multi-family housing, and "zoning in" by tax incentives 
and overzoning good ratables, like industrial uses. The 
sale of zone changes could be considered a form of fiscal 
zoning, if not the pure case where financial considera-
tions are the sole reason for the decision. 
The law of fiscal zoning is not uniform. The zoning en-
abling legislation of at least three states (Colorado, Dela-
ware and Utah) expressly state that zoning may be used 
to protect the tax base of the community. In these states 
both fiscal zoning and zone change sale would clearly be 
proper. In most states, the enabling act states that zoning 
may be used to conserve the value of property and to en-
courage sound community development. Here the auth-
orization for fiscal zoning must be inferred. 
It is generally held that a zoning regulation which is justi-
fied by independent general welfare standards is valid 
"whether or not it is adopted with a view to its effect 
upon tax revenue."153 However, if a zoning ordinance 
can be justified only by reference to its revenue raising 
consequences, its validity is very much in doubt. 154 Thus 
the legality of zone change sales essentially depends on 
whether one can argue that the practice is justified on 
other than revenue-raising grounds. 
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We need to re-examine the suggestion made above that 
an auction represents a case in which the sole justifica-
tion of the outcome is pecuniary. Two considerations 
alter the viewpoint of the case law just outlined. First, the 
sale of a zone change is not thrown open to all. Rather, 
planning criteria are used to determine who the bidders 
will be. Therefore, there are independent general welfare 
standards on which the decision is based. Second, above 
and beyond the particulars of the sale at issue, there are 
more general, public welfare stnadards which justify the 
sale mechanism itself. These standards or policies have 
been outlined; they include the goals of ( 1) assuring ade-
quate worsement compensation, (2) assuring equity, (3) 
minimizing planning distortion, ( 4) preventing corruption 
iri the zoning process, (5) assuring public acceptance of 
public land use planning, and ( 6) raising revenues. The 
sixth and perhaps the first goals are of no use for the pur-
pose of this argument. The others remain and constitute 
a strong justification for the practice. 
As to the need for additional legislation, the debate noted 
with respect to conditional zoning would seem to apply 
equally to this device. 
Four mechanisms for the recovery of publicly created 
betterment, excess condemnation, use-density, conditional 
zoning, and the sale of zone changes, are arguably avail-
able to public authorities without a change in current leg-
islation. If various of the constitutional and statutory 
arguments presented are not accepted, some legislative 
change would be necessary. A fifth recovery mechanism, 
special assessment, may require new legislation, depend-
ing upon variations in existing state and local law. 
V Evaluation 
The case for betterment recovery has been made, and 
three approaches to recovery have been advanced: the 
taxation of all betterment, the taxation of publicly-cre-
ated betterment, and the use of a disaggregated group of 
techniques. How do these approaches compare when 
evaluated in the light of the impediments to betterment 
recovery-political feasibility, administrative cost, and the 
incentive problem? 
1 The Political Milieu 
Betterment recovery would not be necessary to accom-
plish the objectives identified if we were willing to tax 
ourselves by other means so as to remove inequities in 
windfall gains and finance adequate worsement compen-
sation. The optimal, most coherent scheme would per-
haps be to put aside the current capital gains tax and use 
a cleaned-up income tax as the exclusive means of gener-
ating public revenue and paying for public goods. In this 
sense, betterment recovery is a type of second-best solu-
tion. In more practical terms, however, betterment re-
covery has its advantages. Certainly programs of better-
ment recovery would arouse less political opposition than 
would a program based on a wholesale revision of our tax 
structure. Even the two tax mechanisms proposed for re-
covering betterment - the tax on all betterment and the 
tax on publicly-created betterment only - would provoke 
less opposition than such a sweeping change. But of the 
three approaches to betterment recovery identified, the 
most advantageous in this respect is the disaggregated 
approach. Whereas any new tax scheme, no matter how 
limited, would require new legislation, the five mechan-
isms described can be used within the context of present 
Jaw, or with relatively minor modifications of that law. 
Although these non-tax approaches would not require 
significant new legislation, implementing them will re-
quire the support of various actors in the governmental 
process. Government administration should be enthusi-
astic about two of the devices, use density and conditional 
zoning. Use density practice would enlarge the public fisc, 
enhance the image of public enterprise, and give more 
power (to negotiate for the construction, sale and/ or 
lease, or auction of public rights) to the authorized offi-
cial departments. Conditional zoning would similarly in-
crease the scope and amount of power wielded by the 
government entity involved, the zoning authority. Thus 
political incentives exist for the adoption of these mech-
anisms. 
Excess condemnation would appear to offer the same in-
. centives. However, this device presents special considera-
tions. Excess condemnation makes sense only in a limited 
geo-political context - so-called finger or cluster develop-
ment. Finger development occurs when development takes 
place along radial lines from a developed central point. 
Developments along the New York subway system in the 
1890's, the New York commuter train system in the 
1940's, and perhaps the Metroliner lines in this decade, 
are illustrations. Cluster development occurs when major 
infrastructure investment is located at one point, such as 
an airport or a new town. 
Both finger and cluster development are often funded at 
high levels of government. Yet despite this widespread 
investment, betterment will often fall at very discrete 
points, e.g. an interchange or access point, where the in-
vestment and the betterment are large and concentrated. 
The inequity of the recovery of this betterment via local 
authorities is evident: the cost of the geographically wide-
spread investment is no doubt borne by many; why then 
should a few benefit? If money were recaptured locally, 
it could only be used to offset locally created worsement. 
Moreover, a different sort of corruption and planning dis-
tortion might emerge, with local officials trying to influ-
ence decision-makers to better local interests. In short, 
excess condemnation must be practiced by a level of gov-
ernment whieh could spread the benefits recovered over 
an area which would encompass a substantial group of 
people, ideally those who paid for the improvement. 
This does not mean that the political incentives noted do 
not apply to excess condemnation. It does mean that the 
political incentives are likely to have less impact, for the 
217 
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simple reason that a governmental level does not exist 
which could respond to them. Instead, that response will 
be sporadic, corresponding to the ad hoc governmental 
units established for purposes of metropolitan-wide or 
larger public improvement. 
The remaining two of the five partial mechanisms, zoning 
sales and special assessment, create only limited incentives 
for their use. Zoning sales make sense only when two or 
more lots, and preferably more than two, are available on 
which a particular use should be placed. That situation 
would no doubt occur more often if planning criteria 
were applied to a relatively large area, as opposed to the 
area of a typical municipality. Within such a municipality, 
it is unlikely that there will exist three or four locations 
where a shopping center could equally well be located. 
Neither is the reformed special assessment mechanism 
limited to local application. When the benefits of an im-
provement spread beyond the boundaries of a locality, 
the need for non-local administration often arises. A special 
assessment district, whose authority crosses local jurisdic-
tions, would be required. 
To the extent that zoning auctions and special assessment 
practice can be limited to the boundaries of a locality, 
the incentives noted apply. But because the zoning and 
special assessment powers are currently wielded by munic-
ipalities, any transfer of control to an extra-municipal 
administration is liable to encounter stiff political resist-
ance. Moreover, a member of a zoning authority will lose 
much of his discretionary power when he picks up the 
gavel of a zon.ing auctioneer. 
This analysis does not doom the disaggregated approach 
to betterment recovery. Three of the five devices put for-
ward, conditional zoning, use-density, and excess con-
demnation, embody incentives for their application. More 
important, the five devices are in no sense mutually de-
pendent or closed to compromise. If, for example, the 
arguments for betterment recovery are not sufficient to 
persuade local officials to establish an extra-municipal 
assessment district, assessment might be limited to land 
within the locality, if that made sense. If zoning auctions 
on a regional or sub-regional basis are not politically feas-
ible, a betterment recovery scheme can proceed without 
them. 
In summary, it appears that the disaggregated approach 
to betterment recovery would indeed be more politically 
feasible than a legislated tax approach. On the other hand, 
the possibility of local experimentation with betterment 
recovery by taxation should not be overlooked. Munici-
palities may be sufficiently hard-pressed financially to 
override the general opposition to new tax legislation. 
2 Administrative Costs 
The five mechanisms which together constitute the dis-
aggregated approach do entail administrative costs. These 
costs would probably be smaller than those needed to ad-
minister a tax on publicly created betterment, but surely 
much larger than those which a universal tax would entail. 
3 The Incentive Problem 
The problem of discouraging private initiative is inherent 
in a betterment recovery scheme, no matter what its par-
ticulars. However, it may be that a universal tax would 
present a larger problem in this respect than would the 
other two approaches.155 
Awareness of the problem is more than half the solution. 
The problem, after all, exists in all forms of taxation. If 
we design recovery mechanisms which attempt to build 
in a substantial amount of gain to the developer, then we 
can proceed to monitor developments (for instance, whe-
ther land is being withheld from the market) and make 
changes where necessary. 
Incentive can be built into betterment recovery devices 
by regulating the percentage of betterment recovered. It 
may well be that the tax approaches are more adaptable 
in this regard than the five partial devices. Another means 
of building in incentive is by the use of exemptions. 
One blanket exemption has already been suggested, albeit 
in a footnote. 156 Non-profit developers represent a ·special 
class of user which should not be subject to any type of 
betterment recovery. This is particularly true in the case 
of non-profit residential developers where cost increases 
resulting from betterment recovery may create exclusion-
ary conditions of the sort now under constitutional at-
tack in the courts.157 Moreov~r, non-profit developers 
are quite different from for-profit developers in their dis-
position of the betterment they currently receive. For-
profit developers pocket the betterment as a windfall; 
non-profit developers use that money to offset costs in-
curred, thereby passing the betterment along to the ulti-
mate user. Because of the nature of a non-profit enter-
prise, the betterment is put to a public use. For example, 
a non-profit developer who is building subsidized housing 
will use the betterment it takes in to reduce the rent of 
the units it is constructing. This in turn decreases the 
amount of the subsidy (paid by the taxpayer). In this 
way, the non-profit developer itself acts as a betterment 
recovery mechanism. 
In the absence of a firm empirical base, the difference 
proposed in this article between the recovery of all better-
ment and recovery of only publicly-created betterment 
must rest on several tentative theoretical distinctions and 
on speculations concerning administrative costs and polit-
ical feasibility. The difference between the tax approach 
to betterment recovery and the disaggregated approach 
rests on similar grounds. 
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If this is partly a plea for empirical research in the area, 
it is also a plea for experimentation by government. Tax 
approaches to betterment recovery can be implemented 
on any level of government. As we have seen, the disaggre-
gated approach can be partly implemented on a local 
level, as well as on an ad hoc extra-municipal one. These 
various governmental entities could serve as laboratories 
for experimentation in this type of public enterprise. It 
would be an experiment which, unlike so many others, 
promises to pay for itself in cash and in kind. 
The case for betterment recovery has been outlined. Here, 
I want to make two additional points. 
First, it appears that this country is on the verge of a sub-
stantial if not massive New Town movement. Frustrated 
in our attempts to grapple with the problems of the old 
central cities, we seem anxious to shift our attention to 
new places and new opportunities. Reston and Columbia 
were the first steps in that direction. The New Commu-
nities Development Act of 1968158 represents the response 
of the federal government, in the form of substantial 
underwriting of the cost to private developers. 
New Towns may be to the 1970's what urban renewal 
was to the l 950's-l 960's - a "partnership of public and 
private enterprise" that begins with high hopes but ends 
with the public bearing the cost and the private developer 
and the affluent consumer reaping the benefits. The con-
cept of betterment recovery offers public enterprise the 
possibility of building new towns where, as in the British 
experience, the surplus subsidizes low- and moderate-
income housing and various public amenities. 
Second, it has become a cliche that" the fragmented nature 
of municipal government in this country seriously retards 
genuine and effective land use planning. Instead, we have 
fiscal and exclusionary zoning. The betterment recovery 
concept may provide an incentive for centralization of 
land use decision-making. If, as suggested, betterment 
recovery via the disaggregated approach is most effective 
on the extra-municipal level, perhaps the opportunity to 
recapture and share in substantial new revenue will act as 
a carrot for this kind of centralization. 
Tentative steps toward regional land-use planning are now 
being taken. Much of this is on an ad hoc basis, e.g., 
regional pollution agencies, regional water basin agencies. 
Unique for its more general jurisdiction are the so-called 
A-95 area-wide review agencies. Established pursuant to 
the Planned Metropolitan Development Act of 1970,159 
these public authorities must review and make recom-
mendations on all applications for federal loans or grants 
to assist in projects that have metropolitan impact, e.g., 
airports, highways, regional recreation facilities, water 
supply. 160 In some areas of the country, these bodies 
have gone beyond their statutorily defined minimal duties 
to attempt to resolve regional problems such as residential 
segregation. 161 If one of these public authorities should 
obtain the consent of its constituent municipalities with 
respect to the implementation of a plan of betterment 
recovery, there would commence an institutional as well 
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